The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a Balance between Stable Labor Relations and Employee Free Choice by Hall, Ridgway M., Jr.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 2
1967
The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a
Balance between Stable Labor Relations and
Employee Free Choice
Ridgway M. Hall Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Ridgway M. Hall Jr., The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a Balance between Stable Labor Relations and Employee Free Choice, 18 W.
Res. L. Rev. 479 (1967)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol18/iss2/6
1967]
The Appropriate Bargaining Unit:
Striking a Balance Between Stable
Labor Relations and Employee Free
Choice
Ridgway M. Hall, Jr.
The basic policy considerations enunciated in the Wagner Act for
guiding the National Labor Relations Board in its determinations of the
appropriate unit for collective bargaining are discussed by the author.
He then proceeds to analyze the factors which the Board has weighed
in determining the appropriate bargaining unit. Mr. Hall describes the
conflict faced by the Board between the desire to maximize employee
freedom by self-determination elections (which leads to small units)
and the Wagner Act aim of promoting collective bargaining (which in
many cases results in large units). The statute and economic realities,
the author concludes, indicate that unit determinations should be made
on the basis of which unit will best serve the desired end of stable in-
dustrial relations.
NE OF THE MOST problematic areas of labor law, and one
which is repeatedly before the National Labor Relations Board,
is the determination of an appropriate bargaining unit under section
9 of the National Labor Relations Act (NIRA).' Representation
cases, in each of which the
Board must certify the unit of
THE AUTHOR (B.A., Yale University, employees appropriate for col-
LLB., Harvard University) is a practic- lective bargaining purposes,
ing attorney in Stamford, Connecticut,
and is a member of the American and have accounted for approxi-
Connecticut Bar Associations. mately forty percent of all
cases before the Board in re-
cent years. Yet there has
been persistent and often vociferous dissatisfaction with the confus-
149 Star. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
NLRA].
2 The following compilations are based on Appendix A, Table I, in the Annual
Report of the National Labor Relations Board for each year shown:
Total Cases on
Fiscal Year N.LR.B. Docket Representation Cases
1963 32,075 13,176
1962 31,731 13,694
1961 29,698 12,650
1960 29,190 12,360
1959 28,018 11,070
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ing reasoning by which the Board concludes that a particular group
of employees is or is not an appropriate unit.
Much of the discontent with the representation decisions arises
from the difficulty of discerning what the Board is saying. The
problem was highlighted by the recent Supreme Court decision in
NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.' The Board had found an ap-
propriate unit of all debit insurance agents in respondent's district
office in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, despite the presence of nine
other Metropolitan offices in the state.4 The Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit found the decision arbitrary and inconsistent with
prior Board determinations.5 Concluding that in reality the Board
was basing its unit finding not on collective bargaining factors but
on whatever the union was able to organize, the court denied en-
forcement of the Board's order to bargain.6 The Supreme Court va-
cated the decision by the First Circuit, but, finding no clear statement
of the reasoning behind the Board's determination and therefore
finding itself unable to review the decision, the Court remanded the
case to the Board for clarification.7
While the Board was puzzling out its insurance unit findings,
the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc.8 over-
turned one of its major restaurant-chain decisions. Brushing aside
all customary deference to administrative expertise, the court re-
jected on its merits the Board's conclusion that one out of the em-
ployer's ten restaurants in a city could be an appropriate unit.9 With
these two decisions, Metropolitan Life and Frisch's Big Boy, a once
tranquil field of labor relations has burst wide open.
To discuss the bargaining unit determination with employers
and labor unions is to discover that each side has very different ideas
380 U.S. 438 (1965).
4 Representation Case No. 1-RC-7024 (1962) (unreported); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 491 (1963). Because the statute affords no direct review of a
representation case, the only way an employer can get the appropriateness of the Board's
unit determination before a reviewing court is to refuse to bargain, thereby incurring
an unfair labor practice charge. Upon review of the Board's order to bargain, the unit
determination may be challenged.
5 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1964), vacated and
remanded, 380 U.S. 438 (1965).
61d. at 910-11. Section 9(c) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act states in
its relevant parts: "In determining whether a unit is appropriate . . . the extent to
which the employees have organized shall not be controlling." 49 Stat. 453 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (5) (1964).
7 380 U.S. at 442-44.
8 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966).
9 ld. at 896-97. For a similarly brusque reversal, see NLR.B v. Purity Food Stores,
Inc., 354 F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1965).
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regarding what Congress intended that an appropriate bargaining
unit should be. Indeed, the differences in views and interests are
often great between several unions or from one employer to the
next. While the Board is aware of dissatisfaction on both sides, its
attempts at clarification of basic policy seem to have become bogged
down in the tangle of conflicting considerations.
It is the purpose of this article to examine this tangle and its
development and particularly to explore the problems with which
the Board must deal and the objectives towards which it should work
in a unit determination. After a brief consideration of the legisla-
tive delegation of authority to the Board, the criteria for appropriate-
ness which the Board has developed will be examined. These cri-
teria will then be related to the particular problems in two of the
most controversial areas of the Board's unit decisions, namely, the
insurance and the retail chain and department store industries. Fi-
nally, the discussion will focus upon a reconciliation between the
Board's dual functions of encouraging harmonious and effective bar-
gaining relations while protecting the legitimate interests of distinct
employees or groups, for it is this balancing or reconciliation which
is the ultimate problem in every unit determination.
Throughout the analysis it is well to bear in mind that the de-
termination of an appropriate unit is at least as much a political
decision as a legal or statutory one. This is meant not in the sense
that the Board is subject to political pressure (which it may be) or
that members are political appointees (as they often are), but in the
sense that the determination itself, which consists of grouping or
separating people for decision-making purposes, is by nature an ex-
ercise in political science. For this reason the Board's decisions un-
der section 9 are fraught with a number of problems which do not
exist in the more strictly legal determination involved in an unfair
labor practice case.
I. THE STATUTE
Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides in part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit ap-
propriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives
of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment.10
1049 Star. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
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Section 9 (b) states:
The Board shall decide in each case' whether, in order to assure
to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaran-
teed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof. '
In 1947 Congress added section 9(c)(5), which provides as fol-
lows:
In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes
specified in subsection (b) the extent to which the employees have
organized shall not be controlling.12
Under this broad and general delegation, the only affirmative
standard by which the Board is to determine the size and member-
ship of a group which is "appropriate" for collective bargaining is
the 9(b) mandate "to assure to employees the fullest freedom in
exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act." These rights are es-
sentially contained in capsule form in section 7 of the act,' 3 which
assures employees the right to organize, bargain collectively, and
engage in certain concerted activities, or to abstain from all such
organizational activity. The Delphic admonition of section 9(c)(5)
is generally interpreted to mean that although the extent of organi-
zation may not be the only factor in support of a Board determina-
tion, it may be one of several factors to be considered (which neces-
sarily means that in some cases it may be the tie-breaking factor)."'
This construction seems reasonable, since if Congress had wanted
extent of organization not to be considered at all, it could easily have
said so.
There is a latent conflict between section 9(b) and section
9(c) (5) in that while the former says "assure ... the fullest free-
" 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (b) (1964).
1261 Star. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (5) (1964).
1a NLRA § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
14 This is the interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court. NLRB v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965). It is also supported by the legislative history, as
evidenced by the following language in the House Report covering section 9 (f) (3) of
the original bill, H.R. 3020, which survived as section 9(c) (5) of the final act:
Section 9(f) (3) strikes at a practice of the Board by which it has set up as
units appropriate for bargaining whatever group or groups the petitioning
union has organized at the time. Sometimes, but not always, the Board pre-
tends to find reasons other than the extent to which the employees have or-
ganized as a group for holding such units to be appropriate . . . While
the Board may take into consideration the extent to which employees have
organized, this evidence should have little weight, and, as section 9(f) (3)
provides, is not to be controlling. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
37 (1947).
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dom," the latter prevents the Board from simply allowing the em-
ployees any grouping they desire.'" Abstractly, it would seem that
the way to maximize freedom would be to let everyone who wants
a union join one, and let everyone who does not want a union ab-
stain. This rule would dearly make extent of organization the de-
termining factor. Yet as a practical matter it is impossible to give
every employee what he wants and also maintain stable and effective
collective bargaining relationships. To allow every employee in a
given group to have his own union or to be unrepresented, as he
chooses, might maximize short-run freedom of choice, but it would
also maximize long-run chaos. If, for example, a small minority in
a group of employees, all of whom perform identical work on iden-
tical terms for the same wages, were allowed to unionize, the impact
on the unorganized workers would be great. If the union exacted
high wages, the employer might feel bound to meet the raise as to
the unorganized group. On the other hand, there might be very lit-
tle left for the unorganized group, who might therefore have to seek
work elsewhere. If the union received a shortened work day, the
employer might have to shut the entire operation earlier, again di-
rectly affecting all workers. Separate pension funds, grievance pro-
cedures, holidays, and other terms as between workers ostensibly
performing identical work would be likely to generate antipathy
between them. And of course the strike, boycott, or slowdown
would directly affect the working conditions of all. To avoid such
disruption of a majority by the minority, Congress has concluded in
section 9(a) that where there exists such a unity of employment in-
terests, the entire group must abide by the decision of the majority.'6
This does not tell us what an appropriate unit is or how a unity
of employment terms and interests is to be delineated. The statute
gives some exemplary indication in the four possibilities mentioned
in section 9(b): "the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdi-
15There are other conflicts within the statute. For example, NLRA § 8(a) (1),
49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964) makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to coerce employees into exercising their § 7 rights
(see note 21 infra for the text of this section), yet this was not intended to smother all
employer interests in regulating or disciplining employee conduct. A difficult frontier
is reached when under NLRA § 8(c), 49 Star. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(c) (1964) an employer expresses a strong preference for one union over an-
other; if the expression is too strong the employer may fall within § 8(a) (1). Simi-
larly, while § 7 gives each employee the right to join or abstain from a union, § 9 (a)
imposes majority rule. The § 7 right to abstain is also somewhat at odds with the
general statutory policy in favor of organization set forth in NLRA § 1, 49 Stat. 449
(1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C § 151 (1964).
16 For text of the section, see the text accompanying note 10 supra.
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vision thereof."' 7  Beyond this general suggestion, Congress has left
the determination entirely to the Board. This broad delegation may
have been motivated by a desire to leave the development of stan-
dards or tests for appropriateness to the Board's expertise and experi-
ence. Congress might well have been reluctant to shackle the
agency to standards which might later prove misguided or obsolete.
Or, from the point of view of realpolitik, the legislators may have
wanted to avoid the thorny political issue presented by the struggle
between craft and industrial unionism which was raging in 1935.18
In any case, it is dear from the legislative history of the Wagner
Act' 9 that Congress was handing the problem in the broadest possi-
ble terms to the Board."0
The Board's task has been complicated by the fact that while the
union will generally file a petition only for a group which it can
successfully organize, the employer, who is usually opposed to any
union at all, is arguing for a unit of employees which will be most
difficult for the union to organize or win. Neither Congress nor
the Board is prepared to give controlling weight to either of these
interests. Indeed, the employer's anti-union disposition will get no
weight at all. Consequently, the parties are forced to produce other
reasons to support a finding in favor of the unit which they want.
While some of the considerations which have been presented by the
parties have had much validity, others have been totally disingenu-
ous and have served only to confuse the Board and retard the de-
velopment of reliable guidelines.
The task has been further obscured by the fact that the position
of the union as the statutory collective bargaining representative fre-
quently cuts across the idea of employee democracy embodied in
sections 721 and 9." That is to say that although the union pre-
17 For text of the section, see the text accompanying note 11 supra.
18 PELLING, AMERICAN LABOR 164-65 (Boorstin ed. 1960).
1949 Star. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151-66 (1964).
20 The following language from the House Report on section 9 (b) is indicative:
This matter [the choice of the appropriate bargaining unit] is obviously
one for determination in each individual case, and the only possible workable
arrangement is to authorize the impartial government agency, the Board, to
make that determination. H.R. REP. No. 972, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 20
(1935).
21 Section 7 in its entirety states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
[Vol. 18: 479
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sumably represents the best interests of the employees, it also has a
life of its own. It is looking for additional dues-paying members,
often at the expense of another union. Therefore, it frequently has
objectives independent of employee rights, so that in requesting a
particular unit the union may be seeking not so much to vindicate
employee interests as to sweep additional employees into its jurisdic-
tion or simply to prevent a rival union from organizing a group of
employees which it wants for itself. The extent to which the Board
has floundered about before the array of inconsistent arguments has
prompted criticism that it has abdicated its statutory function. Ken-
neth C. McGuiness, a veteran of the NLRB staff, concludes: "The
unit decisions consistently encourage the growth of unionism as
such, rather than protect the rights of employees."'
In order to meet the problems just outlined, the Board has
evolved a set of standards,24 which are very loosely applied, to be
sure. These standards are so often given varying priority, and the
results have been so disparate from one case to another, that they
may be more accurately termed "factors." These factors will be
examined in the next section, both in the light of the statute and in
light of the legitimate interests which the various parties to unit
disputes would like protected.
I. THE FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD IN
FINDING A UNIT To BE APPROPRIATE
The factors which are usually cited by the Board in support of its
unit determinations are "community of interests" (normally defined
in terms of common employee skills, working conditions, and em-
ployment interests); geography and physical proximity; the em-
ployer's administrative or territorial divisions; functional integra-
tion; interchange of employees from one job site to another (notably
in and out of the proposed unit); bargaining history; and extent of
organization. 5 Each of these factors will be separately considered;
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor or-
ganization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).
NLRA § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
2 For pertinent text of § 9, see text accompanying note 10 supra.
23 McGtmwmss, THE NEW FRONTLru NLRB 97 (1963).
24 See Friendly, The Pederal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Defini-
tion of Standards, 75 HARV. L Rav. 863 (1962); Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Leg-
islative Power, 47 COLuM. L. REv. 359, 364 (1947).
25 For a general statement of these factors, see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147
N.L.R.B. 69 (1964); Continental Baking Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 777 (1952); Senator
Taft's analysis of § 9(c) (5) in 93 CONG. Rac. 6860 (1947).
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however, it should be noted at the outset that with the exception of
the rather conceptual "community of interest," none of the factors is
consistently elevated over another. Emphasizing a case-by-case ap-
proach,2" the Board has simply found the factors relevant and has
refused to adopt a hierarchy of tests. Although this approach has
the merit of avoiding woodenness in favor of judging each case on
its own terms, it produces a lack of predictability. Yet predicta-
bility would seem to be a desirable objective for an administrative
agency,27 particularly one which handles a steadily increasing docket
exceeding thirty thousand cases per year.28
A. Community of Interest
Frequently the Board has stated that the "community of inter-
est" among the employees is the primary consideration in delineating
a bargaining unit..29  This community is usually defined in terms of
similarity of work and conditions, wages, terms of employment, and
other common collective bargaining interests, as indicated in section
9(a)." Yet it at once becomes apparent that there can be more
than one community of interest. Common collective bargaining in-
terests have been found among such groups as: all employees per-
forming a single kind of job in one store," all employees in a store, 1
all employees in an employer's metropolitan" or administrative re-
gional area, 4 all employees in a state, 5 all similar employees of a
26 McGuwNEsS, op. cit. supra note 23, at 2, with particular reference to the bargain-
ing unit at 97-113.
2T See Friendly, supra note 24, at 867, 874; Grooms, The NLRB and Determination
of the Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Need for a Workable Standard, 6 WILLIAM &
MARY L. REv. 13 (1965); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the
Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARe. L. REv. 921 (1965).
28 See compilations cited note 2 supra.
2 9 FWD Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 386 (1962); New Orleans Bd. of Trade, Ltd., 1962
CCH NLRB 18572; Continental Baking Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 777 (1952); 27 NLRB ANN.
REP. 63 (1962).
30 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
31 G. Fox & Co., 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. (1966 CCH NLRB) 5 20032 (1965); F. W.
Woolworth Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 307 (1963).
32 Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962); Bullock's, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B.
642 (1957) (dictum).
33 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 N.L-RB. 512 (1962); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea
Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1500 (1952).
34 Father & Son Shoe Stores, 117 N.L.R.B. 1479 (1957); Safeway Stores, Inc.,
96 N.L.R.B. 998, 1000 (1951).
35 Allstate Ins. Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 855 (1957).
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particular employer throughout the nation, 6 or all of a particular
craft or class of employees throughout a region."
The question then arises as to what should characterize the com-
munity. One aspect of community among the employees would
emphasize homogeneity of employee skills. Thus it is not uncom-
mon in the railroad industry to find a single unit which includes all
of a particular class of one employer's workers, even though the in-
dividuals represented are geographically scattered. Another dimen-
sion of the employee community is the intramural aspect, which
emphasizes functional integration and frequent physical contact.
Even though two employees perform very different jobs, if they
work nearby and take their lunch breaks together, there may be
cogent reasons for placing them in the same bargaining unit if sta-
bility and harmony are desirable objectives.
A study of political groupings for the purposes of state and local
government furnishes some interesting analogies. In fact the com-
parison has been made between the bargaining unit and the legisla-
tive voting district,"8 and in at least one important respect this is
sound: the "constitutional draftsmen," i.e., the employer and the
union under the supervision of the Board, are in a position to draw
the lines of the "district" so as to give maximum effect to their own
interests. In short the unit can be gerrymandered. Just as legisla-
tive district lines may be drawn so as to keep a party in or out of
power, so the unit lines may determine whether an employee is rep-
resented by a craft union, an industrial union, or no union at all yet
possibly directly affected by union activity in another group. More-
over, the results of the election will have a tremendous impact on
the employer's policy and consequently on the employees' working
conditions.
In equally significant respects, the bargaining unit resembles a
local improvement district. Improvement districts make a narrower
range of decisions than does a legislature. They are generally con-
stituted for such specific purposes as providing water or schools or
disposing of sewage. Their boundary lines are drawn with a view
towards efficiently performing a function which is physical rather
36 Paxton Wholesale Grocery Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 316 (1959); Western Elec. Co., 98
N.L.R.B. 1018 (1952); Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 81 N.L.R.B. 295 (1949).
3 7 Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 128 N.LR.B. 342 (1960) (multi-store unit of
meat cutters found appropriate).
3 8 See opinion of Judge Madden in S. D. Warren Co. v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 494, 498
(1st Cir. 1965); Note, The Board and Section 9(c)(5): Multilocation and Single-
location Bargaining Units in the Insurance and Retail Industries, 79 HARv. L. REv. 811
(1966).
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than representative, and consequently they rarely conform to legisla-
tive districts. Collective bargaining likewise involves a specialized
area of decision-making. It is true that different decisions may be
implemented at different levels of the employer's administration.
Thus a pension fund may be nation-wide, while grievances are han-
dled at the local level and working hours may be fixed on a regional
level. Yet the way in which the terms are administered, as well as
their substance, is largely contained in the collective bargaining
agreement which is negotiated and administered by the representa-
tive of a particular bargaining unit, together with the employer. 9
Because the range of decisions is relatively narrow and because the
decision-making process between the employer and one or more
unions hinges not on voting power but on negotiating power, cer-
tain special interests among the employees may be legitimately con-
sidered. Aggregate employee interests may be effectively served by
a single monolithic representative, or they may be better served by
separate representation of remote or specially skilled groups.
In short the community of interests must be defined with the
realization that the unit is not created merely for an election but for
a continuing working relationship. After the election, despite the
fact that the particular terms of collective bargaining may have an
impact on a broad or narrow level, the unit determination has a per-
manent effect on the employer's operations and on the employees
both within and without the unit. It will also define a power base
for the union, both at the negotiating table and in a subsequent
election campaign among other employees. Not surprisingly, the
Board has emphasized both homogeneity and contiguity in defining
a community of interest. It might well apply the improvement dis-
trict analogy and look for the grouping of employees likely to lead
to the net improvement of bargaining conditions and relations.
Because there are many possible communities of interest, the
Board's decision must be guided by other factors which support one
or another community. The determination is also likely to be
guided by what the parties request. In general, however, to select
either a very large or very small unit invites problems. For exam-
ple, if the Board determines that only an employer-wide unit is ap-
39 Were the entire employee complement of an employer divided at once into units
which voted on policy or employment terms, then the election-district analogy would
have greater force at this point. Yet, as a practical matter, organization almost always
proceeds on a piecemeal basis. Often, therefore, only a part of an employer's opera-
tions are unionized, and the bargaining agreement applies only to those units for which
the representative is certified. Therefore, as to the bargaining process, the improve-
ment district analogy seems more apt.
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propriate for a national chain store, it would be most unlikely that
any union could ever mount an organizing campaign at such an ex-
tensive level. Consequently, such a determination might delay or
totally deny the rights of employees to be represented by a union.
In addition there might be a dilution of distinct and special interests
which could be better served by separate representation.
On the other hand, to encourage a large number of very small
units, which would mathematically appear to maximize employee
freedom, might produce a highly unstable, factious bargaining rela-
tionship which would be inefficient from the employer's point of
view, and which might well not be conducive to long-range em-
ployee interests.4" While the presence of many different job cate-
gories under a single employer is often cited by smaller or spe-
cialized unions as justification for small units, common collective
bargaining interests do not necessarily require similarity of jobs. It
might be thought that if each job classification were separately rep-
resented by a union thoroughly versed in the nature of the work and
the employee interests, the objectives of all employees would be most
satisfactorily attained. While this theory lies behind craft unionism,
as a practical matter small groups may be subject to greater pressures
by the employer, since he can negotiate with each union separately.
Likewise a plurality of unions can produce gross inequities in the
wage scales, as evidenced by the railroads. Thus the greater bar-
gaining power of a more broadly representative union may in many
cases produce better terms for all. This is particularly true where a
larger unit finding would reduce the dangers of inter-union rivalry
and whipsawing41 of the employer. Different job classifications
then may be set forth separately within a single bargaining agree-
ment, with separate wage scales and terms provided. These are the
more general considerations which the Board must balance in reach-
ing a decision. In fact, the community of interests takes more pre-
cise form in the light of the factors discussed in the succeeding
subsections.
B. Geography and Physical Proximity
It has just been observed that in defining a community of inter-
ests in terms of collective bargaining objectives, several potentially
40 See Jones, Self-Determination vs. Stability of Labor Relations: The Effect of
American Potash, 58 MitH. L REV. 313 (1960).
41 " "Whipsawing' is the process of striking one at a time the employer members
of a multi-employer association." NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87,
90 n.7 (1957). For the purposes of this artide, it will also be used to mean the strik-
ing by one of several bargaining units of a single employer.
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appropriate units may result. Yet the fact that numerous employees
perform similar jobs does not mean that they must be included in
the same unit. A perennial consideration in defining a community
of interest is physical proximity. While the employees of one fac-
tory in New York might have little in common with the employees
in another plant in El Paso, they are likely to have more in common
with the employees in another New York plant a mile away. This
may be due to variations in values and customs from region to re-
gion with respect to employment terms and conditions. Wage
scales alone may differ so that to link two distant groups in a single
unit might pull one group's wages below its area norm while giving
the other group an unexpected boost. On the other hand, where
there are several plants or stores in the same area, the employees
may see one another on or off the job, so that different terms be-
tween the two groups might arouse antagonism between the groups
or between one group and the employer. This parallels the intra-
mural situation in which the more closely stationed are two em-
ployees doing similar kinds of work, the greater will be the friction
and animosity if their terms of employment are different. To avoid
this potential animosity, proximately located employees should be
included in the same unit, especially where they are performing
similar jobs.
The walls of a plant or store and the territorial gaps between
metropolitan areas are two natural boundaries for bargaining units.
Therefore it seems entirely reasonable that the Board should be in-
dined to group employees into a single unit where they are working
in the same store, city, or geographic territory." Unfortunately,
there is no calculus by which to determine at what point geographic
compactness should yield to dissimilarities of skills and bargaining
interests, which may cut in favor of separate units within a single
store, plant, or region.
C. Administrative or Supervisory Division
In a great many cases, the Board has stated its desire to find a
4 2 Weis Mkts., Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 708 (1963) (two separate city-wide units of
meat department employees); Dixie Belle Mills, 139 N.L.R.B. 629 (1962) (single
plant unit); Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962) (single store); Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 512 (1962) (all nine insurance offices in the
greater Cleveland area); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 342 (1960) (all
three of the employer's stores in Atlanta, Georgia); Great Al. & Pac. Tea Co., 119
N.L.R.B. 603 (1957) (all seven stores in Knoxville, Tennessee, together with two
additional stores in Oak Ridge and Alcoa, fifteen and twenty miles distant from Knox-
ville respectively); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 948 (1955) (a multi-
plant city-wide unit).
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unit which corresponds to an employer's administrative division.4
Although the Board rarely indicates precisely why an administrative
division provides an appropriate grouping of employees for collec-
tive bargaining purposes, the reasons are not hard to guess. If an
employer has a highly centralized and integrated operation in which
all labor relations policy decisions come from a single administra-
tive office, it would seem reasonable to meet this uniform, central
employer policy by organization of that group which is directly af-
fected by the decisions. Thus in the field of public utilities it has
been held that the employer's operations are so centralized that a
system-wide or employer-wide unit should be granted whenever the
employees or a union request it.
44
Frequently a large employer divides the country into territories,
each of which are under the supervision of a different officer or
manager. Where a single supervisor handles the hiring and firing,
the first steps in the grievance procedure, and the determination of
which employees will do which jobs, this may provide strong evi-
dence that the employment interests of those under his direction are
in community. In some instances these various administrative func-
tions are sufficiently vested in a single person or within a single
division so that the Board will infer a corresponding community of
bargaining interests and find an appropriate unit of all employees
within the division. Thus during the 1950's, regarding retail de-
partment store chains, a decision such as that in Paxton Wholesale
Grocery Co.4" was not uncommon:
In view of the highly centralized administration of all the Em-
ployer's operations, and as the single-store units sought by the
Petitioner do not conform to any administrative division of the
Employer's operations, we find that the single-store units sought
are inappropriate and that a company-wide unit is appropriate.46
One of the two major problems with giving substantial weight
to administrative divisions is that, as observed earlier,47 different as-
pects of labor policy may be located at different levels. In the insur-
ance industry, for example, an employer often has an administrative
4SDrug Fair-Community Drug Co., 1961 CCH NLRB 16067; Paxton Wholesale
Grocery Co., 123 N.LR.B. 316 (1959); Father & Son Shoe Stores, Inc., 117 N.L.R.B.
1479 (1957); Sparkle Mkts., 113 N.LR.B. 790 (1955); Safeway Stores, Inc., 96
N.L.R-B. 998 (1951).
44 Western Elec. Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 1018 (1952); Niagara Hudson Power Corp.,
79 N.L.R.B. 1115 (1948).
45123 N.L.R.B. 316 (1959).
46 1d. at 317.
47See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
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division which includes six to fourteen states. Many policy deci-
sions are made at that level. Wage scales are often set on a nation-
wide level while hiring and firing may be controlled by a district
director whose authority is less than state-wide. Grievances are
usually initially handled at the office level. In such a context the
boundaries of an administrative division may have little relevance
in defining a community of collective bargaining interests." In-
deed, the territories are established for administrative convenience,
with little concern for labor policy. Finally, the establishment of a
bargaining unit coextensive with an administrative unit leads to
considerable confusion when the employer shifts his territorial divi-
sions.
The second problem with the administrative unit is that it is
frequently too large for a union to successfully organize. This may
in itself indicate that any community of interest at that level is rather
loosely knit. If the Board on its own initiative or at the employer's
request declares that only an administrative division is an appropri-
ate unit, this may operate to forestall organization or deny it en-
tirely. A trend away from the restrictive administrative unit was
announced in the landmark Say-On Drugs, Inc.4" case, and adminis-
trative supervision was made a factor on a more localized level in
the equally significant though more problematic case of Frisch's
Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc.5" In the latter case sufficient supervisory
autonomy was found by the Board in each of ten restaurants located
in a single city to warrant a finding that a single restaurant was an
appropriate unit.
From the employer's point of view, the advantages which flow
from a unit which conforms to a large administrative district are
generally those which are traditionally associated with large units:
stability and minimal whipsawing by rival unions. To split up an
administrative district for bargaining unit purposes does not of itself
adversely affect an employer's operations. Consequently, the dis-
ruptiveness which small units may cause simply goes to the question
of big versus small units, without regard to administrative bound-
aries."
48 Thus it is not surprising that the Board has repeatedly declined insurance com-
pany requests to certify an administrative unit as alone appropriate.
4 9 Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962).
50 147 N.LR.B. 551 (1964), unfair labor practice roceeding, 151 N.LR.B. 454
(1965), enforcement denied, 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966) (unit found inappro-
priate).
51 Many employers find successful bargaining not only where the unit is less than
administrative in scope but also where it combines parts of several different adminis-
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Thus the Board today is giving little if any weight to adminis-
trative divisions, except where, at the supervisory level, the degree of
control vested in a local manager may indicate a similarity of treat-
ment and interest with respect to terms of employment. 2 Quite
rightly, the Board is unwilling to shackle employee organizational
interests to divisions which have no apparent relevance to collec-
tive bargaining factors. Indeed, where common supervision is co-
gent, it is usually because other factors, such as common skills or
conditions, proximity, or interchange, are present.
1A Functional Integration
Functional integration may frequently overlap several of the
considerations, already discussed, notably, physical or geographic
proximity, similarity of conditions, and occasionally common super-
vision. Yet it can exist independently of these other related factors,
and it is frequently cited by the Board as a significant criterion. In
Borden Co., Hutchinson Ice Cream Div.,5" in spite of the hiring
and firing authority of a plant manager, the lack of employee inter-
change, the prior history of single-plant bargaining, and the variance
of working hours based on different local practices, the Board
granted a petition by the Teamsters Union requesting a unit of
three manufacturing-and-distribution plants and seventeen distribu-
tion plants. Said the Board: "ITjhe integration of the Employer's
operations bespeaks the appropriateness of the broad overall unit""
The integrated processes to which the Board referred are production,
distribution, and sale. Yet it is far from dear that the fact that
several classes of employees happen to handle the same piece of
merchandise itself indicates common collective bargaining interests.
The Borden case is further questionable in view of the presence of
the other factors cutting in the opposite direction.
More recently in Potter Aeronautical Corp.55 the Board, revers-
ing the Regional Director, denied a request by Local 47 of the Inter-
national Association of Machinists (JAM) for a unit of the em-
ployer's machine shop employees (fifty-five to sixty men) and held
that a unit which included both the machine shop and the twenty
trative divisions. See First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 27 N.L.R.B. 518, supplementiog 26 N.L-
R.B. 1275 (1940).52 Spartan Dep't Stores, 140 N.L.R.B. 608 (1963); Martin Marietta Corp., 139
N.L.R.B. 925 (1962); Challenge-Cook Bros., 129 N.L.R.B. 1235 (1961).
's89 N.L.RB. 227 (1950).
5 Id. at 229.
555 CCH LAB. L. REP. (1966 CCH NLRB) 5 20037 (1965).
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to twenty-five employees in the electronics department was appro-
priate instead. The case was remanded with instructions authoriz-
ing an election in the broader group if the union showed an inter-
est.56 The two groups were under separate foremen and held
separate job classifications. While the result might have been
logically based on physical proximity and common working condi-
tions, the Board instead grounded its finding entirely on the fact
that various components of the employer's products pass back and
forth from one group to another.57 On this rationale it would seem
that a highly skilled electronic technician, a lathe operator, and a
janitor, all with radically different skills, wages, and interests, could
be grouped in a single unit. Indeed, such a motley unit was
found appropriate in S. D. Warren Co."5
It is submitted that what is really behind the functional integra-
tion factor is the possibility that a work stoppage by one group will
tie up the employees in the other groups. Although the several
groups performed different work in Potter Aeronautical and S. D.
Warren, each was very much dependent upon the other. Thus it
seems only fair that such employees should abide by a majority deci-
sion of all those directly affected by the activities of one component
group.
In Borden, the Board may well have been motivated simply by
the fact that single-location bargaining would have produced a lack
of bargaining power and possible attempts by the employer, who
was requesting smaller units, to play one group off against the
other, thereby creating highly unstable conditions.
The functional integration factor has been used to support
groupings in other contexts where the underlying objective seems to
have been stability. In American Factors, Ltd.,5" a combined unit
of four departments of a building materials supplier was found ap-
propriate based on integrated operations. In Overton Mkts., Inc.,0
the Board found appropriate two ten-store units encompassing meat
department employees in one, and selling and miscellaneous em-
56 Id. 5 20037, at 25116.
57 Ibid.
58 144 N.L.R.B. 204 (1963), approved, S. D. Warren Co. v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 494
(1st Cit. 1965). The Board granted a joint petition by the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, IAM, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, and the
International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers. The unit corresponded roughly to
an administrative grouping and included a wide array of skills ranging from electrical
workers to janitors.
59 1960 CCH NLRB 13738.
60 142 N.LR.B. 615 (1963).
[Vol. 18: 479
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT
ployees in the second. The majority felt that certain integrated as-
pects of the employer's operations, namely joint advertising, com-
mon purchasing, and group profit-sharing and insurance plans,
outweighed the asserted lack of overall bargaining history, absence
of employee interchange, and variance of wages and hours which
cut in favor of separate smaller units." Moreover, as to the second
unit, the Retail Clerks had petitioned for a unit limited to grocery,
produce, and dairy products employees. But the Board insisted that
this unit include warehousemen and separately located bakery em-
ployees solely on the theory that because the bakers supplied all ten
stores, did some selling, and took the same holidays, the entire group
was functionally integrated and therefore an appropriate unit."2
The converse of the factor, namely, functional separation from a
logical or established unit, was the subject of a recent split decision
by the Board in Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp."3 A majority made
up of Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Brown de-
nied a petition by the Teamsters to sever truckdrivers from an exist-
ing production and maintenance group represented by the Paper
Mill Workers on the grounds that the wage scales, hours, benefits,
and seniority for the entire group were similar. Members Leedom
and- Rodgers in dissent argued that the drivers were functionally
entirely distinct from the other employees and that their true com-
munity of interest was with other Teamster drivers. However, in
view of the diverse kinds of employees whom the Teamsters repre-
sent, many of whom are not drivers, this argument is not as strong
as it might be in a different context. On the other hand, it was the
functional distinctness argument upon which the Board later based
its holding in Dixie Belle Mills, Inc.,6" where the two employee
groups in question were in separate plants and the requested single
location unit was granted. The greater physical separation in Dixie
Belle Mills makes the case easily reconcilable with Kalamazoo Pa-
per Box Corp.
Of course the presence of functional integration alone does not
require that the functionally integrated employees be placed in the
same unit. The notable exception is craft severance from a broader
1Id. at 618-19. But see id. at 622 (dissenting opinion).
6 2 1d. at 620.
63136 N.L.R.B. 134 (1962).
64 139 N.L.R.B. 629 (1962). In that case the employer had two plants in Georgia
twenty miles apart with highly centralized management and personnel policies. A
single plant unit was declared appropriate at the request of the Textile Workers Union
not because of physical separation but because of functional separation.
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unit.6 However, there may be special considerations in permitting
craft severance which do not apply to non-craft employee groups.
These considerations are examined later,66 and in general it may be
said that the existence of craft severance does not substantially de-
tract from the principle that interdependent employee groups have
an important community of interest.
E. Employee Interchange
Where employees are frequently transferred in and out of the
proposed bargaining unit, it makes little sense to find such a unit
appropriate for collective bargaining purposes. No worthwhile pur-
pose is served by negotiating a contract for employees A, B, and C
if within a few months they will be replaced by X, Y, and Z.
Moreover, the administration of such a collective bargaining agree-
ment would be disorderly if not impossible. To have an employee
on a different wage scale and possibly different hours as he moves
from unit to unit is irrational. Moreover, a grievance procedure
would become unmanageable if an employer could readily transfer
an aggrieved employee to a unit where there was no grievance prd-
cedure. Likewise, a seniority system and a pension fund covering
such a unit would be chaotic. Thus the Board weighs the frequency
with which employees are transferred in and out of the proposed
unit as a factor in determining the appropriateness of the unit.67
The counterargument is that where the excluded employees are
left without a union the employer will often give them the same
terms which he gives those within the unit in order to eliminate
the incentive of the former group to unionize. Yet if this does
happen, it is often only with respect to wages and other tangible
benefits and then perhaps for a short period. But even if there
were a widespread benefit in wages and terms, it is far from clear
that it would be desirable to encourage a system by which a small
minority would dictate the terms which would in effect be applied
to the majority as well. In any case, such speculation as to what
an employer might do if a single store were certified should carry
65 There are four exceptions to the craft severance rule in the following four highly
integrated industries: National Tube Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948) (steel); Perma-
nente Metals Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 804 (1950) (aluminum); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co.,
87 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1949) (lumber); Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 362 (1948)
(wet-milling). The Board has declined to extend further the National Tube line of
exceptions. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.LR.B. 1418 (1954).
66 See text accompanying notes 197-211 infra.
6 7 Meijer Supermarkets, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 513 (1963); Daw Drug Co., 127
N.L.R.B. 1316 (1960).
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little weight when matched against the high probability that work-
able bargaining will be frustrated where there is substantial inter-
change.
One consequence of placing great weight on employee inter-
change is that it may give employers a tool with which to forestall
organization. That is to say, by frequently transferring employees
between a large group of stores or offices the employer may create
a situation in which the Board is forced to determine that the large
group alone is an appropriate unit. This large unit is likely to be
more difficult for a union to organize.68 Although there is some
indication that in a few instances this has happened,69 the argument
can be overemphasized. An employer who transfers often pays a
price in terms of efficiency, particularly when the jobs in question
involve dissimilar or unfamiliar work. Moreover, in moving em-
ployees from location to location the management may sufficiently
inconvenience and annoy them so as to furnish a fresh incentive to
unionize. Consequently, an employer is likely to think twice before
indulging in excessive and unnecessary transfers.
F. Bargaining History
The Board has repeatedly asserted that it will give considerable
weight to any significant collective bargaining history."° Of course,
the history may apply to an industry, an area, or a particular em-
ployer. The first of these may give some indication of what has
6 It is submitted that it would be exceedingly difficult to make out an unfair labor
practice case against the employer under NLRA § 8(a) (1), 49 Star. 452 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964) (coercion of an employee with respect to
the exercise of organizational rights), under NLRA § 8(a) (2), 49 Star. 452 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (2) (1964) (interference with union organization),
or under NLRA § 8 (a) (3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3)
(1964) (discrimination in order to discourage unionization), since the employer could
almost invariably produce a valid business purpose in defense.
69n Peerless Store, Case No. 1-RC-3498 (1965) (unreported), the Regional
Director denied a petition by the Retail Wholesale Department Store Union seeking
to represent a unit of ninety-six selling employees. The Regional Director found that
a unit of selling, non-selling, and warehouse employees would be appropriate instead.
The RWDSU feels that this result was brought about by the employer's stepped up
interchange between the groups. Interview with Mr. Max Steinbock, Public Relations
Director, RWDSU, Dec. 27, 1965. Mr. Ernest Modern, who is in charge of unit de-
terminations for the First Region and is highly regarded by both management and
labor, feels that at least one insurance company, in response to recent Board deter-
minations that single office units are appropriate, has been increasing its transfers signi-
ficantly. Interview with Mr. Ernest Modern, Assistant to the Regional Director, First
Region NLRB, Nov. 24, 1965.
70 Meijer Supermarkets, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 513 (1963); Eaton Mfg. Co., 121
N.L.R.B. 813 (1958); General Motors Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1958); 27 NLRB
ANN. REP. 63 (1962); 26 NLRB ANN.R P. 55 (1961).
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proven workable for other employers. The second may indicate
the expectations of the parties in light of local practice. Yet be-
cause any rule based on determinations in other contexts is likely to
overlook particular variations in key factors or different employee
preferences, the Board has used the term "bargaining history" to de-
note only the history of bargaining with respect to a particular em-
ployer.'1
There are several reasons why the nature of a unit's bargaining
experience with a particular employer is worth considering. First,
it provides empirical evidence of a workable collective bargaining
relationship (unless of course it has completely broken down). Sec-
ond, although a community of interest might not have existed prior
to the establishment of the earlier unit, years of bargaining collec-
tively may well have established such a community. These argu-
ments are especially persuasive where severance, as distinguished
from initial representation following a lapse of collective bargain-
ing, is sought. Where a collective bargaining relationship already
exists, the incumbent union invariably feels that it ought not to be
harrassed by the possibility that, if it considers long-term interests at
the potential expense of short-run concerns, another union might
come in and gain representation of a dissenting faction within the
larger unit. Thus the Board has held that a five-year multiplant
history will prevent severance of a single plant,"2 and that after
twelve years of employer-wide bargaining the appropriate unit was
all seventeen of the employer's stores."3
Yet by way of counterargument, as a practical matter a union
generally stays in unless it is doing an especially bad job. This is
due in part to the fact that as the incumbent representative it has
far greater opportunity to impress, or at least to communicate with,
the employees. It is also due in part to employee apathy. More-
over, although section 9(c)(3)4 provides only that at least a year
must transpire between representation elections, the danger of organ-
izational activity by rivals has been vastly reduced beyond the pos-
sibility of annual harrassment by the AFL-CIO itself through a series
71 Occasionally the Board does declare a "presumptively appropriate unit," usually
to its subsequent regret, based on accumulated cases involving similar industries with
similar considerations presented. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc., 96 N.L.R1B. 998
(1951); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1635, 1639-40 (1944).
72 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1749 (1953); accord, Mengel Co.,
104 N.L.R.B. 58 (1953).
73 Meijer Supermarkets, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 513 (1963).
74 NLRA § 9(c) (3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3)
(1964).
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of no-raiding agreements which are binding on all affiliates. The
most recent and far-reaching of these is the "Internal Disputes
Plan" which was adopted as an amendment to the AFL-CIO Consti-
tution in 1961."" Although this pact does not cover such non-
affiliates as the United Mine Workers or the Teamsters, it does gov-
ern a substantial majority of the unions usually involved in unit dis-
putes and has gone far to alleviate the problems of union rivalry
which have plagued the labor movement for so many years. Under
this no-raiding pact, which has been supplemented by a number of
jurisdictional agreements between unions, virtually the only way in
which an incumbent union can be threatened by a rival is through a
decertification petition by a majority of the employees in the unit or
in a subdivision which by itself would be an appropriate unit. Ow-
ing to the advantages with which the incumbent is already blessed,
it is highly unlikely that a large group of employees will organize a
successful decertification movement on their own. Moreover, if
this should happen, one can infer that the employees really have
something to complain about concerning the quality of the repre-
sentation which they are getting. To this remote extent at least,
perhaps the possibility of rivalry offers a wholesome incentive to the
union to do its best job of representing the employees.
If such a decertification petition is presented by a group which
would be an appropriate unit and which seeks severance from a
larger existing unit, the Board should consider that to bind a group
of employees by a decision which may have been made in favor of
a larger unit many years ago, and by substantially different indi-
viduals, may not maximize employee, freedom.76 In addition the
75 The AFL-CIO Constitution, art. XXI, provides in part:
SECTION 2. Each affiliate shall respect the established collective bargaining
relationship of every other affiliate. No affiliate shall organize or attempt
to represent employees as to whom an established collective bargaining rela-
tionship exists with any other affiliate. For purposes of this Article, the term
"established collective bargaining relationship" means any situation in which
an affiliate... has either (a) been recognized by the employer.., or (b)
been certified by the National Labor Relations Board....
SECTION 3. Each affiliate shall respect the established work relationship of
every other affiliate. For purposes of this Article, an "established work rela-
tionship" shall be deemed to exist as to any work of the kind which the mem-
bers of an organization have customarily performed at a particular plant or
work site.
76Many units are determined through "consent" elections where the union and
the employer agree on the appropriate unit, often without consideration of the in-
terests of particular employee groups. The Board has held that such "consent" de-
terminations are not binding on the Board. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 100
N.LRB. 107, 113 (1952); Sperry Gyroscope Co., 94 N.LR.B. 1724, 1725 (1951).
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relevant factors may have changed so that a unit which a decade
ago would not have been certified is now eligible.
It would appear from the discussion thus far that the Board
should not allow the mere presence of broad bargaining to auto-
matically prevent severance of employees in a smaller component
unit which would by itself be appropriate in the absence of any bar-
gaining history. Yet frequently the presence of broad bargaining is
accompanied by physical proximity or contiguity, common collec-
tive bargaining interests, and even employee interchange. Even in
the absence of such established determinants, there may be addi-
tional reasons for not disrupting the existing bargaining relation-
ship. For example, if a pension fund has been established and the
withdrawal of a large group of employees would not only cause
major accounting problems but also cost the other employees the
benefits which accrue from the reduced rates at which such funds
are available when a large number of employees are contributing,
then arguably the cost of severance is too great. The result forecast
by this suggestion may at first seem anomalous: a group of em-
ployees (for example, one store of a fifteen-store unit) may be ap-
propriate to establish a bargaining unit but not to sever. Yet the
situations are reconcilable when it is realized that in each case the
Board must, under section 9(b), consider the freedom of not only
the employees within the proposed unit but also those on the outside
who will be affected, since only in that way can aggregate employee
freedom be "the fullest." It is not unreasonable that with no bar-
gaining history a single store out of fifteen would be appropriate
but that after many years in a fifteen-store unit the interests of the
employees in the single store would have become so enmeshed with
and interdependent upon the interests of the other employees that
severance at this point could cause far greater harm to the em-
ployees in the other fourteen stores than would separate representa-
tion at the outset. This injury might well be so substantial that the
single store unit would no longer be appropriate.
In most cases the Board's application of the rule that prior bar-
gaining history is significant and that an existing bargaining rela-
tionship should not be disturbed is sound. Indeed the only consis-
tent exception to the prohibition of severance from an existing
larger unit is the craft severance exception, which has express
Such a stipulated unit may bind the employer and union, however. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 135 (1959).
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support in the statute." Although the Board is justifiably reluctant
to extend this exception, a caveat should be expressed that the gen-
eral rule is sound only so long as it is invoked to preserve an existing
and proper community of interest.
Finally, where amalgamation into a larger unit is sought by em-
ployees in an existing smaller unit, the disruption is likely to be
minimal, and consequently the weight given to the prior history in
that case should be correspondingly reduced.
G. Extent of Organization
It has already been pointed out that under section 9(c) (5) the
extent to which the employees have organized may be a factor in
the Board's determination, but it may not be the only factor.7" Of-
ten it is virtually impossible to tell when the Board is giving con-
trolling weight to the extent of organization. The writers of the
majority opinion are reluctant to mention the words. This difficulty
is compounded by the organizational factor which is built into any
union petition, namely, that the union will seek only a group of
employees among whom it thinks it can win a majority. In general
an administrative agency is presumed to be acting within its statu-
tory authority,"m yet the recent shift in Board policy towards greater
flexibility has produced a marked rise in the number of union peti-
tions which are granted, often by a three-to-two decision in which
the dissenters charge that the majority is being controlled by the
extent of organization in violation of section 9(c) (5)." Employers
have begun to complain bitterly of a "sellout" to the unions. These
developments have caused reviewing courts to take an increasingly
skeptical view of the Board's reasoning.81
One set of circumstances which has been cited as evidence of a
9(c) (5) violation is that in which a union has sought to organize a
7 7 NLRA § 9(b) (2), 49 Star. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2)
(1964). See Celotex Corp., 105 N.L.R.B. 815 (1953); W. C. Hamilton & Sons, 104
N.L.R1B. 627 (1953); see also text accompanying notes 197-211 infra.
78 See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra. See generally the able studies of this
factor in Note, sura note 38, at 819-26; Note, Section 9 (c) (5) and Bargaining Unit De-
termination in the Insurance Industry, 19 RUTGERS L REV. 739 (1965).
79 See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NIRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947).80Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 1037 (1962); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 565, 567-68 (1962); Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 134 N.LR.B.
960,962 (1961).
81See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 906, 909 (1st Cir. 1964),
vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 438 (1965). For a discussion of the case, see text
accompanying notes 3-7 supra. See also NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d
167 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 943 (1960).
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large group of employees, has failed, and then seeks a determina-
tion by the Board that a smaller subdivision of the original group
constitutes an appropriate unit. NLRB v. Glen Raven Knitting
Mills, Inc.,82 presented such a case. In 1951 the petitioning union
sought to organize the employer's entire plant but lost. In 1954
the union unsuccessfully tried to organize all production employees.
Thereafter, at the union's request, the Board permitted a smaller
unit of knitting employees. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that this sequence demonstrated that the extent of orga-
nization was the only factor considered, and consequently the Board's
order to bargain was not enforced.s This ruling indicates that al-
though a unit may be appropriate for any other union which has not
previously sought a larger group,84 once a union tries for a different
unit and fails, it is disqualified from the game. Surely it must be
clear that although prior unsuccessful attempts may suggest the rea-
son why the union filed a petition for the smaller group, it by no
means follows that in granting the request the Board was also moti-
vated by organizational factors.
Appellate exasperation was more justified in Judge Woodbury's
opinion for the First Circuit in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
NLRB.85 There the court reviewed a series of decisions in which
the Board had grouped insurance offices in less-than-state-wide units
of varying size and compactness, with what appears to have been no
common rational theme, save that in each case the union got what
it requested.8" At least one inference which can be drawn from this
pattern is that extent of organization was controlling. Yet as the
Supreme Court later observed, this is not the only reasonable infer-
ence.87 Because different results may reflect different fact situations
or simply shortsighted reasoning by the Board, as well as the pos-
sibility that extent of organization has been controlling, the jump
by Judge Woodbury to the latter conclusion was not upheld8
82235 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1956). See also the dissent in Allied Stores, Inc., 150
N.LR.B. 799 (1965).
83 235 F.2d at 416.
84 A unit of knitting employees in a similar unit was in fact upheld by the Fourth
Circuit a year later, when there was no showing of prior attempts to organize on a
broader level. NLRB v. Morgantown Full Fashioned Hosiery Co., 241 F.2d 913, 915-
16 (4th Cir. 1957).
85 327 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1964), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 438 (1965).
86 Id. at 907-11. For a discussion of these cases, see the text accompanying notes
105-19 infra.
87 NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 442 (1965).
8 8 Id. at 444.
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Some critics attack the Board's approval of small units as though
small units were by nature inappropriate. Yet the legislative his-
tory suggests that Congress was primarily concerned about fragmen-
tation of a unit into several inappropriate units. In addition to the
language of the House Report cited earlier,89 the following remarks
by Senator Taft, explaining the form of the bill adopted by the joint
conference, support this view:
Subsection 9(c)(5) adopts the House amendment written to
discourage the Board from finding a bargaining unit to be appro-
priate even though such unit was only a fragment of what would
ordinarily be appropriate, simply on the extent of organization
theory.90
Subsequently, Senator Taft further explained the purpose of 9(c) (5)
in reply to criticism that this section might prevent the Board from
finding small groups to be appropriate units:
This amendment... overrules the "extent of organization" theory
sometimes used by the Board in determining appropriate units.
Opponents of the bill have stated that it prevents the establish-
ment of small operational units and effectively prevents organiza-
tion of public utilities insurance companies and other businesses
whose operations are widespread. It is sufficient answer to say
that the Board has evolved numerous tests to determine appro-
priate units, such as community of interests of employees in-
volved, extent of common supervision, interchange of employees,
geographic considerations, etc, any one of which may jaustify the
finding of a small unit. The extent-of-organization theory has
been used where all valid tests fail to give the union what it de-
sires and represents a surrender by the Board of its duty to deter-
mine appropriate units. Its use has been particularly bad where
another union comes in and organizes the remainder of the unit
which results in the establishment of two inappropriate units.91
Clearly Congress had no antipathy to small units as such. Congress
asked only that the Board find that at least one of its non-organiza-
tional criteria support its decision.
Although small units may be entirely appropriate, in many in-
stances the Board has encouraged organization at the larger of two
appropriate unit levels. This is especially true where the Board
finds that stability is highly desirable either in the industry or with
respect to a particular employer. Yet the argument might be made
that to arbitrarily grant a petition for the larger unit which com-
prises several smaller units which, if separately requested, might
themselves be appropriate, would violate 9(c) (5). The argument
89 See note 14 supra.
90 93 CONG. Rzc. 6444 (1947).
o'Id. at 6860. (Emphasis added.)
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is that to permit the union to have a small unit (for example a single
store) when it requests it and in another case to permit it to have a
larger unit (all the stores in a region) would be to base the deci-
sions on what the union could organize. However, the language of
9(c)(5) seems to apply only to the determination that a unit is or
is not appropriate and not to a choice between two appropriate
units. As to the smaller units, the legislative history makes dear
that 9(c) (5) was designed to prevent fragmentation into a unit inap-
propriate on its merits, not the breaking down of a large unit into
lesser component appropriate units."2 Consequently, the Board
should not fear a violation of 9(c)(5) by choosing the broader or
the narrower appropriate unit, depending upon which is likely to
produce the most effective bargaining relationship.
III. THE FACTORS IN THEIR CONTEXT
A. The Insurance Industry
(1) Historical Developments in the Board's Rulings.-The his-
tory of the appropriate bargaining unit in the insurance industry
might be written with the Board as the tragic hero. Early in its
career it made a small mistake. Seventeen years later it realized the
error but, instead of acknowledging it, the Board garbled its lines,
bringing a storm of brickbats upon its subsequent decisions.
Although initially the union organization of insurance com-
panies was sporadic, the Board decided in a 1944 case involving the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company that a state-wide grouping of
debit insurance agents9 3 was the most appropriate unit. 4  Because
a number of insurance companies have nation-wide operations, with
multi-state administrative divisions, employers have habitually in-
sisted that successful collective bargaining could only take place on
one of these broader levels. In the light of subsequent experience,
it would appear that this position was taken largely to forestall
unionization. Nevertheless, in response to the suggestion, the Board
frequently encouraged the establishment of larger units. In Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of America, 5 the Board found a thirty-one-state unit
92 It is well settled that a union need not seek the largest of several alternatively
appropriate units. P. Ballantine & Sons, 141 N.L.R.B. 1103 (1963); Ballentine
Packing Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 923 (1961).
93 The "debit" agent is so called because his geographic territory of primary re-
sponsibility is called a "debit."
9 4 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1635 (1944). A similar result was
reached in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 962 (1942).
9580 N.L.R.B. 1583 (1948), amended, 81 N.L.R.B. 295 (1949).
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appropriate, and in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,9 a nation-
wide unit was certified as appropriate, excepting offices in three
states which had previously been organized by other unions. In-
deed, the Board was so impressed with the drive by the CIO to
organize John Hancock on a nation-wide level that, prior to the
1949 decision just cited, the Board denied a petition by a rival AFL
union requesting state-wide units in Maryland and Delaware."
During the 1950's the unions were able to organize some re-
ceptive employees on a large scale, but they were unsuccessful in a
number of companies. This was largely due to the great difficulty
in sustaining union enthusiasm at a high pitch in a large number of
offices across a state at the same time, particularly since the em-
ployees were exposed daily to the employer's anti-union propaganda.
Although the Board continued to deny petitions for less than state-
wide units of debit agents, it did not extend the rule to insurance
adjusters9" or to derical employees,9 9 among whom units of less
than state-wide scope were permitted. Further evidence of dissatis-
faction with the rather wooden Metropolitan Life rule appeared in
1959 in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., °9 wherein a union sought rec-
ognition of a single office. Although the petition was dismissed,
based on Metropolitan Life, Member Fanning wrote a separate con-
curring opinion in which he urged abandonment of the rule in
favor of a more flexible approach based on the traditional factors.''
Two years later Fanning's position was adopted in the landmark
case of Quaker City Life Ins. Co.' Granting a petition for a single-
office unit in Alexandria, Virginia, the Board overruled the Metro-
politan Life doctrine in these terms:
The rule was adopted solely in anticipation of broader orga-
nization on a companywide or statewide basis, which at the time
seemed imminent. As a practical matter, however, such statewide
or companywide organization has not materialized, and the result
has been to arrest the organizational development of insurance
agents to an extent certainly never contemplated by the Act or for
9682 N.LR.B. 179 (1949).
97John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 64 N.LR.B. 541 (1945). As of this time the
CIO represented 166 of Hancock's 189 district offices, while the AFL represented only
fifteen.
98 Travelers Ins. Co., 116 N.LR.B. 387 (1956).
9 9 Texas Prudential Ins. Co., 109 N.LR.B. 319 (1954).
100 123 N.L.R.B. 610 (1959).
'
0 1 Id. at 613, 614 (concurring opinion).
102 134 N.LR.B. 960 (1961), affd, 319 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1963), enforcing 138
N.LR.B. 61 (1962).
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that matter, by the Board that decided the Metropolitan Life
case.
1 0 3
The Board acknowledged that the Metropolitan Life rule was
forestalling organization to an extent not contemplated by the stat-
ute. Nevertheless, it strongly suggested that the reason why it was
abandoning the rule was not so much that smaller units might be
inherently appropriate and that the state-wide minimum require-
ment was actually denying employees organization rights contrary
to sections 7 and 9(b); rather, the suggestion was that by allowing
smaller units the Board would make it easier for the unions to
organize. In short, the Board gave every appearance that it was this
organizational consideration which, as the two dissenting Members
asserted, controlled the decision in violation of section 9(c) (5).
In terms of statutory construction and application, the Board
had made a serious mistake in allowing its 1944 Metropolitan Life
holding to become a hard and fast rule. The effect of that rule in
the view of most employers and many observers was that under the
established criteria used by the Board there could not be a suffi-
ciently marked community of interest among insurance agents in
groups of less than state-wide scope to warrant a finding of an ap-
propriate bargaining unit. This rule by 1961 carried the sanction of
seventeen years of rigid application. Criticism could have been
averted only by a carefully written opinion, strongly emphasizing
the language and purpose of section 9(b) and setting forth in con-
siderable detail the factors by which the Board concluded that a
community of interest as to collective bargaining objectives could
be found in the single office. The Board, working under a back-
breaking case load and possibly unaware of the significance which
its decision was to have, was not up to the task.
In retrospect, it seems that state-wide units had been in fact a
compromise between employer demands for multi-state units and
union demands for units of less than state-wide scope. Spokesmen
for the insurance companies, the Insurance Workers International
Union (IWIU), and the Board acknowledge this.10 4 Indeed, the
state-wide unit, when tested against established factors, is remarkably
103 Id. at 962.
104 The writer has verified this "compromise" through a series of interviews. Em-
ployers who have expressed such a view have understandably requested anonymity, since
they are currently involved in collective bargaining and organizational activity, not to
mention the fact that the appropriateness of the less than state-wide unit is still under
litigation at this writing. Mr. Ernest Modern of the NLRB strongly asserts that the
state-wide rule was in fact such a compromise. Interview with Mr. Ernest Modern of
the NLRB, Nov. 24, 1965.
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inappropriate. No large company has administrative divisions cor-
responding to state boundaries. Labor policy is formulated either
at the local or employer-wide level. Employment terms and condi-
tions have no relationship to state lines, except for the fact that
there are occasionally state licensing requirements. Finally, offices
separated by a state border may be geographically doser to one
another and may experience more contact or interchange than of-
fices within the same state.
(2) The Impact of Quaker City.-The departure from the Met-
ropolitan Life compromise is not likely to injure legitimate employer
interests. The usual employer argument that a large unit is easier
to negotiate with and is administratively more efficient is not sup-
ported by the facts. An employer can negotiate with many units
just as easily as he can with one, since the many units can be cov-
ered by a single master contract. Moreover, since the insurance
field is dominated by a single union, the IWIU, the employer has
not the frictions of rival unionism and multi-union bargaining which
characterize the retail chain store industry. Although the employer
may be angry that the Board turned its back on him in Quaker
City, his efficiency is not impaired by smaller unit determinations.
This does not mean, however, that indiscriminate unit deter-
minations of less than state-wide scope may not be injurious to
legitimate employee interests. To approach this aspect of the prob-
lem it is worth examining the crazy-quilt of decisions which fol-
lowed Quaker City. In 1962 the Board found appropriate a unit
consisting of all six Metropolitan Life Insurance Company offices in
the city of Cleveland, together with its three suburban offices.1"5
The rationale behind this decision was that, since in Quaker City
the Board had found a single office appropriate, it would also be
appropriate to group several proximately located offices into a sin-
gle unit. In appraising this conclusion, it is worth noting that the
company divided the nation into fourteen administrative territories
and that its operations were highly centralized, with nation-wide
uniformity as to wages and terms. Labor policy decisions, including
final hiring and firing, were handled at the home office in New
York City. The "central" administrative territory, which includes
Cleveland, comprises sixty-eight offices. Rejecting the employer's
preferred units of (1) nation-wide, (2) territorial, and (3) state-wide,
105 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 512 (1962), unfair labor practice, 141
N.LR.B. 1074 (1963), enforced, 330 F.2d 62 (6th Cit. 1964), vacated and remanded
per curiam, 380 U.S. 525 (1965).
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the Board furnished some of the information which it had omitted
in Quaker City:
[W]e rely particularly upon the fact that each such office is a
complete, self-contained operating unit; that there is a substantial
distance between the district offices here involved and the home
office; that each office is in certain respects autonomous in its day-
to-day operations; that there is separate, immediate supervision in
each such office; and that there is no transfer or interchange
among offices. Although we have found that the individual dis-
trict offices may constitute separate appropriate units, we do not
believe that such a finding should preclude the grouping of such
offices where such grouping is justified by cogent geographic con-
siderations. 10 6
Shortly after this Cleveland decision, the Board found appro-
priate a unit of both offices of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany located in Wilmington, Delaware."' Metropolitan had a
third office in the state, but it was located forty-six miles away. At
approximately the same time, the Board found two out of seven
offices in greater Pittsburgh to be separate appropriate units, even
though the two offices were only seven miles apart.' 8 The geo-
graphic considerations make the latter decision look at odds with
Metropolitan (Cleveland), but the Third Circuit affirmed the deci-
sion per curiam, based on its earlier acceptance of the Delaware
case.1
0 9
In other cases, the Board has found the following insurance
units appropriate: all debit agents in the greater Detroit area;" 0 a
single office in Woonsocket, Rhode Island;" two offices in Cleve-
land and a detached office twenty-eight miles away in Lorain (a
"detached" office is under the administrative control of the urban
office) ; .2 a single office in Sioux City, Iowa, together with detached
offices in Fargo, North Dakota, and Sioux Falls, South Dakota, 284
and 120 miles distant, respectively; . 3 and all thirty-three of the
106 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 512, 515 (1962). (Footnote omitted.)
107 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 565 (1962), unfair labor practice,
141 N.L.R.B. 337 (1963), enforced, 328 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1964), vacated and re-
manded per curiam, 380 U.S. 523 (1965).
108 Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 538 (1962), aff'd per curiam, 328
F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964), vacated and remanded per curiam, 380 U.S. 522 (1965).
109 NLRB v. Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 328 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964), vacated
and remanded per curiam, 380 U.S. 522 (1965).
"1OMetropolitan Life Ins. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1577 (1964).
"'IMetropolitan Life Ins. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 491 (1963) (unfair labor practice),
enforcement denied, 327 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1964), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S.
438 (1965).
- Equitable Life Ins. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 529 (1962).
113 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 734 (1962).
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employer's offices within the political city limits of Chicago, Illinois,
excluding suburban offices, despite the fact that six of the city offices
had territory extending beyond the city limits and three of the four-
teen suburban offices had territory extending into the city.114 What
was so magic in the Chicago city boundary which was not present
in Metropolitician (Cleveland)? The First Circuit, in comparing
these two cases, fumed:
Why there should be a community of interest among Metro-
politan's agents working from both city and surburban offices in
Cleveland but no community of interest among its agents working
in both city and suburban offices in Chicago is not explained by
the Board majority and is beyond our comprehension."15
Had the Board found extensive interchange within the Chicago city
limits but not across the line or bargaining terms common to the
urban offices but not the suburban offices, this might have offered
some justification. If a self-determination election had shown that
the employees within the city favored a union and those in the
suburbs rejected it, this would have provided a rational basis. Yet
in its Chicago opinion, which reversed the Regional Director's selec-
tion of a metropolitan area unit, the Board alluded briefly to geo-
graphic considerations - which seem far from cogent - and made
no further attempt to meet the charge of arbitrariness."'
Powerful evidence that the Board has been simply giving the
union whatever it wants was supplied by the Metropolitan attorneys
in their brief to the Supreme Court in the Metropolitan (Woon-
socket) case. In an appendix, they diagrammed the forty-six cases
involving bargaining unit disputes in the insurance industry since
the Quaker City decision." ' In all forty-six the IWIU was the pe-
titioner, and in each case the petition was granted for whichever
unit the union had requested."
Since the Supreme Court has not yet passed on the merits of the
less than state-wide insurance unit, the Quaker City rule remains
unsettled. In February 1966, the Board issued its revised opinion
in the Woonsocket, Rhode Island, case on remand from the Su-
114 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 144 N.L.R1B. 149, 151 (1963), enforcement denied,
327 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1964), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 438 (1965).
115 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 906, 910 (1st Cir. 1964).
116 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 144 N.LR.B. 149, 150-51 (1963).
117 Brief for Appellee, app. A, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NIRB, 380 U.S. 433
(1965).
118See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 906, 910 (1st Cr. 1964),
vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 438 (1965), to the same effect.
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preme Court."' Although the employer had revised its administra-
tive structure in the hope of having the single-office unit held inap-
propriate in favor of broader "regions," the Board adhered to its
prior decision. Yet despite a lengthy discussion of its decisions and
an admission of the difficulty of the problem, the Board added noth-
ing new by way of guidance. If ever the case reaches the Supreme
Court again, it will probably be approved in much the same fashion
as SEC v. Chenery Corp.2 '
Assuming that Quaker City and its progeny survive, it would be
erroneous to conclude, as a recent commentator has done, that sec-
tion 9(c)(5) will have in effect been read out of the insurance in-
dustry, and "therefore, that cohesive groupings of individually appro-
priate units should be permitted without regard to the albatross of
'extent of organization.' ""21 Bearing in mind that 9(c) (5) is aimed
at preventing fragmentation, it might reasonably prohibit an at-
tempted grouping of the employees in a fraction of an office. 2'
Moreoever, if the Board responds to the Supreme Court's admoni-
tion with respect to grouping of several offices,'28 it is not unlikely
that alternative units of a single office or a city-wide grouping might
be appropriate. If so, an attempt by a union to split a city down
the middle or to arbitrarily pick less than all the offices within the
,city would be clearly prevented by section 9(c)(5). Perhaps the
most unsatisfactory aspect of the 1966 Metropolitan (Woonsocket)
decision is that the Board failed to indicate a position on this ques-
tion.
Yet there are strong reasons why the Board should hold that
where there is more than one insurance office in a single city the
union must take all or none. Although there tends to be very little
interchange between offices, there is considerable contact between
the debit agents of the several offices within a city. Frequently
there is competitive bidding for policy contracts between employees
of different offices, thereby producing informal jurisdictional agree-
119 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 113 (1966).
120 332 U.S. 194 (1947). In a prior case, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80
(1943), the Supreme Court held that an order by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion could not be supported on the basis of the agency's vague and insufficient reasoning.
The Commission thereafter recast its reasoning and reached the same result. This time
the Court held that the rationale was sufficiently dear, and sustained the Commission's
ruling. 332 U.S. at 199, 209.
121 Note, supra note 78, at 758 (1965).
122 Fractured offices may become a problem in the near future, for the IWIU is
planning to organize clerical employees as well as the debit agents. Yet in this area it
has a threatening rival, the Office and Professional Employees International Union.
12 NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1965).
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ments or compromises between the employees. Geographic consid-
erations would likewise support a city-wide unit. Nearly all the
Board's single-office units have involved cases where the office re-
quested is the employer's only office in that city. 24 Nor has the
IWIU ever petitioned for a fragmented city unit, leaving aside the
Metropolitan Life (Chicago).25 case which involved a city-wide unit
that excluded suburban offices and which is to that extent open to at-
tack. That the union feels the interests of effective collective bar-
gaining favor a city-wide unit was exemplified in the 1WIU cam-
paign to organize the three Metropolitan Life Insurance offices in
Albany, New York.2  By the early spring of 1965, one of the
offices dearly showed a majority for the union, a second was about
even, and the third office was so completely against the union that
it doubted that it could win a three-office election. Rather than re-
quest a unit of the one office where it was assured of victory, the
union decided not to petition until such future date as there might
be city-wide interest in organization. Where the employers and
the dominant union are in general agreement that fractured city
units are undesirable, there is little reason for the Board not to
concur.
Section 9(c)(5) may be of further use operating together with
section 9(b) to prevent a union or employer from "sweeping in"
an unwilling office under the impact of majority support in other
offices. A grouping of offices which in some cases may comprise
several smaller appropriate units on a "building-block" theory might
be highly appropriate in itself, or it might be inappropriate either
because of the prejudicial impact on those excluded or on the re-
lated theory that the unit is a fragment of a larger appropriate unit.
Following an examination of the somewhat more complex problems
presented by retail chain and department store units, it will be con-
124 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 N.LR.B. 688 (1964) (a single office in Holy-
oke, Mass.); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 491 (1963), enforcement denied,
327 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1964), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 438 (1965); Quaker
City Life Ins. Co., 134 N.LR.B. 960 (1961), affd, 319 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1963).
125 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 149 (1963); accord, Western & So.
Life Ins. Co,, 138 N.LR.B. 538 (1962) (allowing two suburban office units near Pitts-
burgh).
126 This position was confirmed in an interview with Mr. Robert J. Nicholson, Vice
President of the IWIU, Jan. 22, 1966. Mr. Nicholson furnished the information con-
cerning the Albany Campaign which follows, and observed that his union "has never
petitioned for a single district office within a city where more than one district office
is located in the same city." In view of the IWIU's understandable desire to preserve
maximum flexibility with respect to unit scope, however, it does not wish to take a posi-
tion which might impair the Board's present view that a single office is an appropriate
unit.
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sidered to what extent "sweep-ins" should be minimized through
separate elections.
B. Retail Chain and Department Stores
Retail store unit selections may involve a multi-location choice
or an intramural choice. These two levels of the problem are rep-
resented by the chain stores on the one hand and the department
stores on the other, and each is discussed separately in the next two
subsections. The balance of the section is devoted to problems
which are more or less common to both.
(1) Developments in the Choice of Units in Chain Store
Cases.-The unit findings in retail store cases have been almost as
varied as in the insurance industry. As with the insurance cases,
the trend is dearly towards an increased willingness on the part of
the Board to find small units appropriate.
Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, 2 ' the Board avoided rigid rules
and certified employee groups of many sizes, openly acknowledging
that there could be appropriate communities of interest at different
levels of the employer's operations. A single-store unit was found
appropriate in Koppers Stores,' while a twenty-four-store city-wide
unit requested by the Amalgamated Meatcutters was granted in a
1944 case involving First National Stores. 2 ' Administrative divi-
sions could be fractured along state lines. 8 ' Even a single de-
partment of bushelers in a May Department Store was found appro-
priate.' 8 '
Following the passage of the Act with its admonitory section
9(c)(5) in June 1947, the Board showed a marked reluctance to
find small units appropriate. Single-store requests were often de-
nied, 2 although they were granted where there was a high degree
127 161 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
12873 N.L.R.B. 504 (1947).
129 First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 55 N.L.R.B. 1346 (1944). This was a "wall-to-wall"
unit and induded all employees, not just the meat departments.
12oFirst Nat'l Stores, Inc., 27 N.L.R.B. 518, supplementing 26 N.L.B. 1275
(1940). The employer's Providence division covered employees in Rhode Island, Con-
necticut, and Massachusetts. Following a self-determination election, the Amalgamated
Meatcutters were certified as representative of the employees in the Rhode Island stores
while the Industrial Union and Mercantile Beneficial Association of Providence were
certified as representatives of the Massachusetts and Connecticut stores respectively. The
Meatcutters have subsequently expanded their jurisdiction to include both of these units
plus New Hampshire and much of Maine.
131 May Dep't Stores Co., 50 N.L.R.B. 669 (1943).
182 E.g., Grand Union Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1949), which was overruled by V.
J. Elmor 5c, 10c & $1.00 Stores, Inc., 99 N.LR.B. 1505, 1506 (1952). The request
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of local automony and geographic isolation. 3 ' The single depart-
ment unit, which had been approved in the May Dep't Stores3"
case, was rejected in a 1948 request for a unit of men's alteration
department employees.'35  "Building-block" units comprised of
stores in various communities purporting to be neither a regional
nor an administrative grouping were flatly rejected on the grounds
that the only basis for such a combination would be extent of orga-
nization..3 6 Petitions for city-wide units were, however, granted.'
The Board seemed primarily interested in encouraging groupings
based on territorial compactness or administrative division. Its fre-
quent rejection of single-store and departmental units suggests that
at least for a few years after the arrival of 9(c) (5) the Board felt
that there were rarely, if ever, sufficient non-organizational factors
which could support such units.
During the 1950's the Board's policy became somewhat more
stabilized. Units consisting of an employer's administrative division
were generally found appropriate. In 1951, in Safeway Stores,
Inc., ' the Board said:
[Albsent unusual circumstances, the appropriate collective bar-
gaining unit in the retail grocery trade should embrace all em-
ployees within the categories sought who perform their work
within the Employer's administrative division or area.139
This rule was by no means hard and fast. Frequently units com-
prised of stores within a metropolitan region were also found appro-
priate."' Where the Board found a highly centralized employer-
wide operation, it found an employer-wide unit appropriate and re-
jected a petition for single-store units.' 4"
In the early 1960's with the appointments by President John F.
was for the employer's only store in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. In rejecting the petition,
the Board found that broader centralized management control outweighed the stores'
geographic separateness and the dearth of employee interchange.
133 E.g., American Stores Co., 82 N.LR.B. 882 (1949).
13450 N.L.R.B. 669 (1943).
135 Mandel Bros., 77 N.LR.B. 512 (1948).
136 E.g., C. Pappas Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1272 (1948). The employer had twenty-one
Massachusetts stores. The union sought a unit of some stores in the Boston area to-
gether with others as much as thirty miles away, while excluding stores which were
more nearby.
'37 Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 680 (1949).
13 8 96 N.L.RB. 998 (1951).
139 Id, at 1000. Accord, Father & Son Shoe Store, 117 N.LR.B. 1479 (1957).
140 Daw Drug Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 1316 (1960); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 119
N.L.R.B. 603 (1957); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 99 N.L.RLB. 1500 (1952).
141 Paxton Wholesale Grocery Co., 123 N.LR.B. 316 (1959).
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Kennedy of Chairman McCulloch and Member Brown to the Board,
smaller units were allowed under an express change in the Board's
policy. Two cases involving Hot Shoppes, Inc., a multi-location
cafeteria and restaurant employer, were decided on February 10,
1961. In one case 42 the union sought a unit of the employees at
the Washington, D.C., airport, including food and dishroom em-
ployees, switchboard operators, cashiers, truckdrivers, hallmen, laun-
dry employees, porters, and station attendants. The petition was
granted despite the fact that there were forty-six other Hot Shoppes
and seventeen related Pantry House outlets in the greater District
of Columbia metropolitan area. Member Rodgers dissented, find-
ing the metropolitan area appropriate in view of centralized man-
agement, administrative integration, uniform conditions of employ-
ment, geographic proximity, and substantial employee inter-
change.148 The Board apparently felt that despite the different
kinds of work involved, there was a community of interest among
the employees at the single location which distinguished them from
employees located at separate sites, even though the others were
performing similar jobs.
In the other Hot Shoppes case decided on the same day, the
Board dismissed a petition for a unit of all truckdrivers and helpers
at the employer's Midway Airport location in Chicago.' The
Board held that here the appropriate unit would have to also include
the employees at the employer's O'Hare Airport operation, located
twenty miles away. 4' As to multi- versus single-location considera-
tions, the two decisions seem contradictory. What the Board seems
to have said is that if a union seeks a "wall-to-wall" unit of all em-
ployees, a single location unit is appropriate, but if it seeks only a
particular class of workers, it may be required to include similar
employees at other nearby locations. Such a rule strains logic, be-
cause if a single class of workers is appropriate for separate repre-
sentation and a single location constitutes a community of interest
distinct from other locations, it is difficult to see why both principles
should not operate together in a single case. There is language in
the second decision suggesting that its true basis was the fact that
the petitioning union had three times failed to win elections, twice
in units including employees at both airports, leading the Board
14 2 Hot Shoppes, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 138 (1961).
14' Id. at 143-44.
144 Hot Shoppes, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 144 (1961).
145 Id. at 146-47.
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to believe that the union itself felt that the only appropriate unit
would have to include both airport locations and that a single-
location unit would therefore be a fragment. However, to base a
decision on these prior failures rather than on the true issue of
whether the requested single-location unit is appropriate in itself is
a dearly misguided concession to the reasoning of NLRB v. Glen
Raven Knitting Mills, Inc.4' which was rejected as being illogical
in the preceding analysis of the Board's factors. 4 '
Some of the confusion raised by the Hot Shoppes cases was re-
moved by the leading case of Say-On Drugs, Inc.,4 ' decided the fol-
lowing year. Here the Board held that a single store in an em-
ployer's chain was an appropriate unit. The Board in effect rejected
the rule in Safeway Stores, Inc.'49 and the associated line of cases
which held that the administrative or regional unit was to be en-
couraged as presumptively appropriate. 5 The rejection of the ad-
ministrative unit presumption seems sound on the basis of earlier
analysis of this factor.'51 As in Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 5' the
Board's reason for altering its established rule was that the presump-
tion in favor of a large unit was forestalling some groups of em-
ployees in their section 7 right to organize. 5 ' In support of the
Say-On Drugs rule is the Board's more time-honored holding that a
single plant in a manufacturing context is presumptively appropri-
ate. 54 This presumption has support in the statute in view of the
fact that it is one of the several units specifically mentioned in sec-
tion 9(b),"' and accords with geographic and common-sense no-
tions of a community of interest as existing among all the employees
within the walls of a single factory. It would seem, moreover,
that the single retail store is closer to a single plant than is a lone
insurance office, since the single store typically has a large and di-
146 235 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1956).
147 See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
14 8 138 N.L.P-B. 1032 (1962).
349 96 N.L.ILB. 998 (1951).
150 138 N.LR.B. at 1033.
151 See text accompanying notes 43-52 supra.
152 134 N.LR.B. 960 (1961), af'd, 319 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1963), enforcing 138
N.LR.B. 61 (1962). See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
153 138 N.L.R.B. at 1033.
'54 Gordon Mills, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 771 (1963); Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139
N.L.R.B. 629, 631 (1962).
155 'The Board shall decide in each case whether ... the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof." 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
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versified group of employees, while the insurance office does not.
Partly in view of this analogy, the single-location retail unit was
more readily accepted than the single insurance office unit.
Particularly with respect to supermarket chains, the impact of
the Say-On Drugs ruling does not seem to be so great as to prevent
multi-store units where traditional criteria support such a determina-
tion. In WYeis Mkts., Inc.,' the Board found two multi-store, city-
wide units appropriate. In Meijer Supermarkets, Inc.,'57 where
there was a twelve-year history of chain-wide bargaining and a
highly centralized administration, an employer-wide unit was held
appropriate. In Overton Mkts., Inc.,'58 the Amalgamated Meatcut-
ters were granted a unit of all meat department employees while
the Retail Clerks International Association was granted a unit of all
grocery and produce employees, bakers, and warehousemen. Both
units comprised all ten of the employer's stores in Norfolk, Virginia.
(2) The Large Department Stores.-While Say-On Drugs has
severely restricted the administrative unit presumption in chain
store cases, further narrowing of the unit size has taken place with
respect to the larger department stores. During the 1950's the
Board frequently stated that the store-wide unit was presumptively
appropriate in department store cases.' However in 1965 the
Board held in Allied Stores, Inc.' that this store-wide presumption
will not preclude a unit of a particular category of employees within
the single store. The store in question had 695 employees and 130
departments. Separate units of 470 selling employees, thirty non-
selling employees, and seventy restaurant and kitchen workers were
found appropriate at the request of the Retail Wholesale and De-
partment Store Union (RWDSU), which had previously lost an
election in a store-wide unit.
In an earlier case, the Board had granted a petition seeking a
unit limited to restaurant and kitchen workers.'' Moreover, the
departmental distinction within a grocery supermarket, which was
156 142 N.L.R.B. 708 (1963).
157 142 N.L.R.B. 513 (1963).
158 142 N.L.R.B. 615 (1963).
15 9 Bullock's Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 642 (1957); May Dep't Stores, 97 N.L.R.B. 1007
(1952) (holding the store-wide unit optimum but nonetheless granting a petition for
a departmental unit of hair stylists and beauticians because they were a homogeneous,
previously unrepresented group).
160 Allied Stores, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 799 (1965). Similar results were reached
in two companion cases: Arnold Constable Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 788 (1965); Lord &
Taylor, 150 N.L.R.B. 812 (1965).
161 F. W. Woolworth Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 307 (1963).
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seen in Overton Mkts., Inc.,..2 has been common in department
stores for many years, even where a single location is involved.163
However, the Allied Stores, Inc. decision was in total opposition to
the general rule of T. P. Taylor & Co.'64 that
The Board has long regarded all selling and nonselling employ-
ees as a basically appropriate unit in the retail industry. This is
particularly apparent in department store cases where the Board
has had numerous occasions to pass upon issues with respect to the
appropriate unit. 65
The Board's rationale in departing from this rule was that there
are recognizable differences between selling and nonselling em-
ployees: sales employees usually receive classroom training whereas
nonselling employees are trained on the job; the nature of the work
is different and requires different skills; in this case there was sep-
arate supervision, little interchange, and the groups were generally
physically separate; finally, the groups dressed differently. Plainly,
the Board is drawing finer lines than ever before in finding separate
communities of interest. The case was followed in G. Fox & Co.,'
in which the Teamsters were allowed a separate unit of all truck
drivers and delivery department helpers, as well as a second unit of
all mechanics and washermen, despite the employer's claim that
the unit should include all selling and nonselling employees. The
Board stated "that while the store-wide unit is presumptively appro-
priate for collective bargaining, it is not the only appropriate
unit."1
67
In discount stores, where the departments are often run by
lessees of the employer who frequently hire and prescribe terms for
the employees in their particular department, the Board has held
not only that the single department is an appropriate unit but also
that a store-wide unit is not appropriate. 6 However, where the
employer exercises substantial control over the lessees and their em-
ployees, as evidenced by uniform hours and working conditions or
162142 N.L.R.B. 615 (1963).
163See American Stores Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 882 (1949). The separation is by no
means universal. See note 129 supra.
164118 N.LR.B. 376 (1957).
16 5 1d. at 378. In Root Dry Goods Co., 126 NL.R.B. 953 (1960), the Board al-
lowed a separate unit of selling employees where the employer and union were in agree-
ment that this unit was appropriate.
1665 CCH LAB. L. REP. (1966 CCH NLRB) 5 20032 (1965).
167Id. g 20032, at 25108.
108 S.A.G.E., Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 325 (1964).
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regulations which apply strictly to all employees in all departments,
the store-wide unit has been found appropriate.' 69
As the foregoing cases have illustrated, the Board is willing to
find communities of interest worthy of separate representation on a
wide variety of levels in the retail industry. While the outcome
from case to case will differ, the criteria for appropriateness should
remain constant.
(3) Rival Unionism.-As to the choice between several possi-
ble appropriate units, the retail industry is complicated by a feature
which does not presently characterize the insurance industry, namely,
the presence of many rival unions. Where there are several unions
competing for representation of various groups of employees, a num-
ber of administrative considerations cut more effectively against en-
couraging small units than in an industry which is largely domi-
nated by a single union. In the insurance industry, a finding of
several small units may be justifiable if the reasonably foreseeable
result is piecemeal organization of many small units into an ulti-
mately broad bargaining base represented by one union. In the
retail chain store field, however, an employer may have one store or
group of stores organized by the Retail Clerks, the next by the
Amalgamated Meatcutters, and a third by the RWDSU, with ware-
housemen organized by the Teamsters, and certain other small
groups such as bakers or tailors represented by still different unions.
Thus to grant a petition by one union for a single store in a city in
which the employer has many stores may lead not to piecemeal or-
ganization by the petitioning union but to multiple organization by
its rivals.
The latter result will not only produce less harmonious indus-
trial relations than will a broader unit, but it will also cost the
employer more in negotiating time since he must deal with a multi-
plicity of unions. While this impact on employer efficiency is gen-
erally not recognized under the statute, it may have considerable
bearing on whether an effective collective bargaining relationship
is likely to result, and this certainly is an important consideration in
terms of the purpose of the statute. Where an employer must
deal with many unions and devote substantial resources to pacifying
or playing off one union against another, the loss is ultimately
passed along to the employees, both through smaller profits avail-
169 Spartan Dep't Stores, 140 N.L.R.B. 608 (1963); Frostco Super Save Stores, Inc.,
138 N.L.R.B. 125 (1962).
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able for wage increases and through the inability to attain the requi-
site stability to consider long-range employee interests.
Whipsawing of an employer for better terms, often in the hope
of impressing employees in another unit with the whipsawer's power
and ousting a rival union of jurisdiction in a later election, has
proven destructive to the interests of all the parties concerned. This
was recognized in the AFL-CIO No-Raiding Agreement of 1954,17
the objectives of which were extended by the Internal Disputes
Plan which in 1961 became a part of the AFL-CIO Constitution."
While these pacts have largely reduced problems presented by one
union's attempting to oust another as the representative, they have
heightened the efforts of rival unions in vying for better terms.
The bitter and age-old rivalry between the Amalgamated Meatcutters
and the Retail Clerks, for example, manifests itself through substan-
tial pressures upon the employer to grant one something more than
was given to the other. If one union can at least give the appear-
ance that it is more effective than its rival, there remains the possi-
bility of a decertification proceeding initiated by the employees
themselves if they are sufficiently impressed by a union other than
the one which represents them. A more promising objective is to
build a record and a following which will enable the union to win
elections in other stores not yet organized. This latter opportunity
provides a tremendous impetus for rivalry today.
The ensuing pressure upon the employer caught in the crossfire
is not only disruptive but also results in his being unable to differ-
entiate between two groups of employees even where there is a
legitimate reason to do so. It is a common employer complaint that
he dare not give a needed wage raise to one group since another
group will be at his throat for the same.7 2 This often produces
distorted wage scales, exemplified in the extreme by the factious
railroad industry.
There are inevitably lesser administrative problems as well, par-
ticularly where the employees at a single location are represented
by several unions. One retail employer, for example, customarily
170 This agreement was followed up after the merger of the AFL and CIO in 1955
by a revised No-Raiding pact in that year. 3 CCH LAB. L. REP. 5 5230.95 (1966).
171 The relevant sections of the Internal Disputes Plan are set forth in note 75 supra.
Similar objectives are reflected in the context of work assignments under the National
Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes, binding on AFL-CIO build-
ing and construction unions.
172 Interview with Mr. J. David Fine, Director of Industrial Relations, Stop & Shop,
Inc., Dec. 16, 1965. See Jones, Self-Determination vs. Stability of Labor Relations The
Effect of American Potash, 58 MIc-. L. REv. 313 (1960).
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had his meat department employees assist the checkout clerks in
servicing customers during the rush periods. Once the meat depart-
ment employees and the checkout clerks became represented by sep-
arate unions, this temporary interchange was impossible, even
though the resulting deterioration in customer service at the peak
periods could only reduce sales and thereby injure all the parties
concerned.'
A further disruptive force to stable industrial relations which
ought not to be overlooked is the multiple-site strike threat. The
employer's chances of being struck increase with the number of
unions representing his employees. Moreover, the impact of a strike
can be disproportionately severe.where a small unit forces the shut-
down of an entire store, or a whole chain. The Board in Frisch's
Big Boy lU-Mar, Inc.'74 held that one of the employer's ten restau-
rants in Indianapolis constituted an appropriate unit. The Board
found a weekly transfer rate of three percent minimal, cited the au-
thority of the individual restaurant managers to hire, fire, and disci-
pline as well as to purchase food, admitted that the city-wide unit
might well be optimum, and granted the petition, since no union
sought a wider unit.' In a scorching dissent, Members Leedom and
Jenkins argued that the single restaurant was inappropriate not only
because interchange was in their view substantial and working con-
ditions were uniform but also because, under the Board's holding in
Alexander's Warehouse & Sales Co., 7' the representative at one
restaurant could picket all the others. 77 This leverage would give
the union greatly disproportionate bargaining power which would
directly affect the terms and working conditions of the employees at
the nine other locations. In the view of the dissenters, this would
not at all maximize employee freedom but would shackle the inter-
ests of the majority of the affected employees to the decision of a
small minority. 7
From the position of the employer, one may well ask whether
it is advisable to give the union such disproportionate power as to
be able to tie up the entire chain based on single site representation.
173 This happened at Stop & Shop, Inc. Interview with Mr. J. David Fine, note 172
supra.
174 1964 CCH NLRB 21035, unfair labor practice, 151 N.L.R.B. 454 (1965), en-
forcement denied, 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966).
175 Id. at 21036-37.
176 128 N.LR.B. 916 (1960).
177 1964 CCH NLRB at 21037-39.
1781d. at 21039.
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On the other hand, perhaps the only way to insure against a union
picketing sites where it is not the representative is to require em-
ployer-wide representation or none at all. Yet this suggestion
proves too much and must be rejected as unduly inhibiting organiza-
tional rights. As a practical matter, multi-location picketing tends
to be geographically restricted, since most representation disputes
are with the union local rather than with the international, and
large scale picketing can be expensive. In addition, picketing at lo-
cations where the union is not represented may well annoy rather
than impress employees whom the union ultimately hopes to orga-
nize. Finally, the unions are aware that employers can be perma-
nently embittered by such multi-site picketing, which they regard
as outside the legitimate arsenal of coercion on behalf of the par-
ticular group represented. Many unions are coming to feel that
there may be more to be gained today by a relatively amicable
approach rather than a warlike one.17 If at some point multi-site
picketing does become a serious problem, the proper solution would
seem to be further legislation on picketing rather than adoption by
the Board of an unduly restrictive unit rule. In fact, when Frisch's
Big Boy Ill-Mar.8 . came before the Seventh Circuit on review, the
court bluntly reeled off a series of employment terms which were
identical from one location to the next, emphasized the highly cen-
tralized supervision, and held the unit plainly inappropriate, with-
out reference to the multi-site picketing problem.181
One possible variation of the facts presented in Frisch's Big
Boy Ill-Mar would be a situation in which the employer has several
stores in a metropolitan area and the union seeks to organize the
single store which is the distributor for the others or is in some
other way the nerve center of the city-wide operation. A work
stoppage at this store would have the direct effect, without picket-
ing, of stopping the work at the other stores. As a practical matter
this would be rare, since most retail operations are not set up in
179 If an employer is on friendly terms with a union, he may express a favorable
opinion of this union in a subsequent election at a different location. Unions appre-
date the covert assistance which an employer can give by "opening his doors" to a union
which he prefers while making difficult the campaign of a rival which he dislikes. This
mild interference at the fringe of NLRA § 8 (a) (2), 49 Star. 452 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1964) (for text of this section see note 184 infra), can be
of tremendous assistance to a union, yet very difficult to prove at a hearing, moreover,
non-coercive speech alone enjoys broad protection under NLRA § 8(c), 49 Star. 452
(1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
180 356 F.2d 895 (7th CiA. 1966).
1811d. at 897.
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this fashion." 2 Should the case arise, however, the direct impact
on the employees excluded from the requested unit would suggest
that on grounds of functional integration, the group of stores should
not be split up. The employment interests of the outlying stores
are so directly tied to the work conditions at the central store that
the Board might be well-advised even in the absence of significant
interchange to find the city-wide community of interest the smallest
appropriate unit.
(4) The Accretion Clause.-The foregoing discussion has at-
tempted to point out some of the dangers in small retail units. One
of the most recent devices on the part of the labor unions to avoid
factious rivalries is the use of a broad accretion clause in the collec-
tive bargaining contract. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the
Retail Clerks, and the Amalgamated Meatcutters, to name three of
the more dominant occupants of the retail industry, have all found
it desirable where possible to obtain recognition from an employer
as the bargaining representative for all stores in an entire region,
including stores which may be opened in the future. Employers,
eager to avoid whipsawing, are frequently willing to grant this
recognition. A typical broad accretion clause provides:
The company recognizes and acknowledges the Union as the
sole collective bargaining agency and representative of all Meat,
Fish, Delicatessen and Poultry Department employees in New Eng-
land for all stores operated by the Company and all of the stores
that may hereinafter be operated by the Company throughout the
life time of this Agreement.183
Thus when a new store is opened in the stated region, it is auto-
matically, and without an election, covered by the bargaining agree-
ment. This minimizes harassment of the employer and provides a
broad bargaining base for the union.
It can be argued that the prior recognition of employees in an
accretion clause is an improper interference by the employer with
employee organization, in violation of section 8 (a) (2),184 and that
it inhibits the free choice of a bargaining representative. However,
182 However, for such a factual situation, see Hudson Co., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 133
(1965).
183 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Stop & Shop, Inc., and Locals 2, 33,
314, 328, 371, 592, Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of No. America,
art. I, § 2, effective Aug. 10, 1964.
184 This section provides in part that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor or-
ganization or contribute financial or other support to it." NLRA § 8(a) (2), 49 Star.
452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1964).
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section 8(a) (2) seems to be aimed primarily at company unions
rather than independent international unions which have won initial
recognition pursuant to an election or a series of elections.' Thus
while the Board has not definitively ruled on the applicability of
section 8(a) (2), its recent decisions have permitted reasonable accre-
tions. 1
86
In at least one earlier case, Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,87 the Board
did suggest that where following an election but prior to the execu-
tion of a contract the union and employer by consent included an
additional and different group of employees into the unit, this might
be an unfair labor practice.' But since the rival union was at-
tacking only the increase in numbers in the unit and not the accre-
tion itself, the Board rejected the claim and made no further men-
tion of an unfair labor practice.'
The accretion clause used in the retail industry would seem to
fall somewhere between the addition of similar employees to an
existing unit in the normal turnover of hiring, which is clearly law-
ful without an election, and the addition, by stipulation, of an
entire group whose skills are different from those in the initial
unit. The latter practice was regarded ominously in Anheuser-
Busch but is distinguishable from the situation under discussion
in which the accreted employees perform work similar to the old
employees. The Board's recent tendency to permit automatic inclu-
sion of employees in a new store who are performing similar work
and whose inclusion into the existing unit will provide a territorially
compact and contiguous bargaining base seems correct. The only
difference between such an accretion and the hiring of new em-
ployees is that in the former case the employees are taken as a
group and separated by the walls of a store and might, absent the
185 Of course, if an independent union won recognition at the employer's sole plant
and the parties then executed a nation-wide accretion clause and thereafter the employer
established a dozen additional plants across the country, this begins to look like a com-
pany union, so that the Board should require separate elections.
186 Continental Can Co., 127 N.LR.B. 286 (1960); Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 129
N.LR.B. 361 (1960); Borg-Warner Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 152 (1955), enforced, 231
F.2d 237 (7th Cit. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 908 (1956) (holding that reasonable
accretions of employees in new departments and buildings do not violate §§ 8 (a) (1)
or 8(a) (2), even though there is a union-shop clause); Saco-Lowell Shops, 107
N.L.R.B. 590 (1953). Occasionally the Board has required self-determination elections
offering employees the choice of inclusion in the existing unit or separate representation,
where such separation would itself produce two appropriate units. See Allied Chem.
& Dye Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1958).
187 102 N.L.R.B. 800 (1953).
188 Id. at 815.
189 Ibid.
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prior bargaining relationship, constitute an appropriate unit by
themselves. While the proposed accretion may be different in de-
gree from normal turnover, it is very different in kind from the
Anheuser-Busch accretion. Moreover, the very existence of the
prior bargaining relationship would seem to bring the case within
the principle, if not the rule, of Eaton Mfg. Co. 9' in which the
Board held that where there is an established history of multi-
location bargaining, a unit limited to employees at a single location
is not appropriate, even though such a single-location unit might
otherwise have been appropriate.'
In the Meatcutters' contract provision referred to before,"9 2 the
parties have established a territorial unit of similarly skilled em-
ployees which is appropriate by existing Board standards. There is
little to be said for allowing the employees of a newly opened store
to split off from this unit, even if the store by itself would be an
appropriate unit. Admittedly, to thus risk subordination of the in-
terests of a single store to those of the regional majority may ap-
pear to restrict the freedom of an accreted employee who did not
vote in the initial election. Nevertheless, it may be said in reply
that, first, he does not accept his new job blind to the fact that he
is also accepting an existing bargaining representative and is free to
work elsewhere; second, in. practice there has appeared no signifi-
cant employee complaint, while the system has proven highly effec-
tive in reducing the evils of rival unionism; third, the stable indus-
trial relations which are likely to ensue, together with the broad
power base of the union, will almost certainly provide as great or
greater benefits for the accreted employees as would separate repre-
sentation.
The entirely distinguishable question of craft severance is re-
served for separate treatment.
(5) Conflicts in Union Philosophy: The Allied Stores Case.-
Not all unions are in agreement, either on the use of the accretion
clause or on other fundamental questions involving bargaining unit
determinations. The RWDSU feels, for example, that all em-
ployees should be given a free choice, and that the accretion clause
simply serves the union's selfish aims of excluding competitors and
assuring its own aggrandizement. 9 ' Consequently, this union never
190 121 N.L.R.B. 813 (1958).
191 Id. at 815.
192 See note 183 supra.
193 Interview with Mr. Max Steinbock, Public Relations Director, RWDSU, Dec.
27, 1965. Mr. Steinbock also believes that unions pay for accretion clauses by having
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uses an accretion clause. Not surprisingly, the emphasis placed by
the RWDSU on individual free choice also leads it to favor smaller
bargaining units, often in direct opposition to the views of other
unions. Serious questions are presented when several unions who
regularly represent the same kinds of employees fundamentally dis-
agree on the philosophy, objectives, and means of employee orga-
nization.
In the Allied Stores, Inc. 9 4 department store case, the RWDSU
was granted three separate units of selling, non-selling, and kitchen
and cafeteria employees at a single location, despite the contentions
of the employer and the intervening Retail Clerks that a store-wide
unit was the smallest appropriate grouping. In convincing the
Board that the three requested groups of employees constituted dis-
tinct communities of interest, the RWDSU argued that section 9(b)
(employee freedom) demands that small but coherent groups be
allowed to organize even if &her proximately located groups are
opposed.
In their'amicus curiae brief, the Retail Clerks argued that the
wall-to-wall department store unit was historically appropriate and
ought not to be splintered. The Clerks contended that a depart-
ment store is a highly integrated operation and that there is constant
contact and frequent interchange among employees, especially be-
tween the selling and non-selling groups. Small units, urged the
Clerks, lack the bargaining power to make substantial gains. More-
over, they lead to antagonism between organized and unorganized
groups, particularly where striking or picketing is involved; they
invite the evils of rival unionism producing several weak but factious
units instead of one strong one; in the event of a strike the em-
ployees can be quickly replaced by the employer, who is happy to
be rid of them anyway; and they produce such administrative prob-
lems as multi-contract negotiations and inequities in wages and
terms between departments, which are costly to both the employer
and the union. "The only real justification for segmentized or frag-
mented organizing in a department store," said the Clerks, "would
be to serve as a springboard from which the store as a whole can
be organized."' 95 However, such piecemeal organization rarely suc-
to accept lower wages, so that in effect the accretion-minded union grows at the expense
of the employees.
194 150 N.L.R.B. 799 (1965).
195 Brief for Retail Clerks International Association as Amicus Curiae, p. 18, Allied
Stores, Inc., 150 N.LR.B. 799 (1965). See also the RCIA brief in Thriftown, Inc.,
Case No. 24-RC-2761 (1965), making the same argument regarding discount depart-
ment stores.
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ceeds, since the employer usually grants the unorganized employees
the same wages and benefits as he gives to the organized group,
thereby destroying the incentive of the others to join. Yet when it
comes time to negotiate, the union is left with its small bargaining
power. The Retail Clerks cited their own experience that such
piecemeal attempts were highly unsuccessful. Moreover, they
pointed out that their own election victory percentages were consid-
erably higher than those of the RWDSU, interpreting this as a
more favorable employee response to broader units. Finally, the
Clerks distinguished craft unionism on the ground that while the
craft unions seek to protect the integrity and standards of a small
and specialized class of employees, such limited organization is not
feasible where store-wide organization is the ultimately desired ob-
jective.
That the RWDSU indeed was aiming at ultimate store-wide
organization is strongly supported by the facts that (1) it had previ-
ously lost a store-wide election, and (2) the three requested units,
when put together, constitute virtually a store-wide unit. Yet the
RWDSU denies the validity of the Retail Clerks' argument, claiming
that immediate freedom of choice should not be subordinated to long-
range stability which may never materialize if employees are not at
first organized. It may be that the Retail Clerks, the largest and
most powerful of the retail chain store unions, are moved to their
conclusions, at least in part, by the fact that they stand a much better
chance of winning elections if large units are required, demanding
broad-scale campaigns which their smaller rivals are unable to
match. Moreover, if the employer does extend union gains to unor-
ganized employees, perhaps the union is really more worried about
free riding by non-dues-paying workers than by the decertification
election threat.
Despite possible self-serving aspects of the Retail Clerks' argu-
ment, there remains a lot to be said for looking to the long-term
objectives of stable and effective collective bargaining as well as
harmonious relationships among employees themselves. The no-
tion of countervailing power is also behind the Clerks' preference
for city-wide units where the employer has more than one store in a
metropolitan area.'96 Thus whether one agrees with the Allied
196 Letter from Samuel J. Meyers, First Vice President of the RCIA, to the writer,
Jan. 12, 1966. On the other hand, the Retail Clerks do not always argue that a broad
territorial unit is the only appropriate one. After all, it was they who won Say-On Drugs,
Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962), which to a considerable extent opened the door to
small unit findings.
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Stores decision depends on whether long-term stability or short-
term employee free choice is accorded the primary position. Al-
though the latter consideration is a necessary element of a unit
determination, the larger units for which the Retail Clerks argue
seem generally to be more conducive to effective collective bargain-
ing. The store-wide (or city-wide) unit tends to be more permanent
and less prone to disruptiveness. Under such conditions, somewhat
paradoxically, the varied interests of the employees, immediate and
long-range, are more likely to get fair consideration than when an
employer must beat down wages in the face of whipsawing. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the Retail Clerks have been more suc-
cessful at the polls than has the RWDSU.
(6) Craft Severance and Allied Stores.-In arguing that
smaller than store-wide units need not impair stability, the RWDSU,
and the Board itself in the Allied Stores, Inc.' decision, place sub-
stantial weight on the craft severance analogy. If separate repre-
sentation does not lead to chaos in the craft severance context, the
argument goes, why should the principle not be extended to the
department store?
In evaluating this position, the results of a survey of employers
recently faced with craft severance elections published in 1960 by
Professor Dallas Jones are helpful.'98  The survey reports that the
great majority of employers felt that separate representation of craft
employees by different unions was disruptive to labor relations. Yet
it is significant that where craft severance was rejected, 86.6 per-
cent of the employers were opposed in principle, whereas among
the employers whose employees had voted in favor of craft sever-
ance, only 65.1 percent were opposed.9"' The fact that hostility to
severance was less among employers who had had first-hand experi-
ence with it suggests that employers tend to overestimate its alleged
evils. On the other hand, the consensus that craft severance is not
conducive to stable bargaining relations is entitled to considerable
weight, particularly in view of the fact that, since all the employers
in question were unionized, there is no reason to believe that their
expressions were motivated simply by anti-union sentiment. The
question posed by such a survey is whether the disruption of em-
ployment relations is justified by considerations favoring self-deter-
mination.
197 150 N.LR.B. 799 (1965).
198 See Jones, supra note 172.
19 9 Id. at 325.
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A number of reasons may be cited for allowing the employees of
a true craft to be represented separately from the overall production
and maintenance employees. The skills possessed and required by
the craftsman set him apart from the semi-skilled or unskilled pro-
duction worker. Because he is able to command higher wages, there
is danger that his distinct earning power would be diluted by inclu-
sion in a unit of unskilled employees. Moreover, the true journey-
man craftsmen undergoes an apprenticeship or training program
which is often administered by a craft union. The union is an
expert on the craftsman's collective bargaining interests which it
can in turn present to the employer. These historically distinctive
qualities of the craft employee are reflected in the express statutory
authority for separate representation. The "craft unit" is one of
those mentioned in the section 9(b) delegation, and section 9(b)(2)
further provides that the Board shall not "decide that any craft unit
is inappropriate . .. on the ground that a different unit has been
established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the
employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate repre-
sentation."2 °
The requirements for separate craft representation were set forth
by the Board in the leading case of American Potash & Chem.
Corp.,2 ' which was decided in 1954. Although the case had a lib-
eralizing effect on craft severance,02 the Board's position seems
quite restrictive when compared to its decision in Allied Stores,
Inc.2"' American Potash requires that the proposed craft unit com-
prise "true craft" employees possessing those skills which can only
be developed after a substantial period of apprenticeship; the em-
ployees must be engaged in work requiring these skills; the unit
must include all such employees; finally, the petitioner must be a
union which has traditionally represented the special interests of this
class of employee.0 4
200 NLRA § 9(b) (2), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2) (1964).
201 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
202 Compare the less permissive line of cases under American Can Co., 13 N.LR.B.
1255 (1939).
203 150 N.L.R.B. 799 (1965).
204 American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1423-24 (1954). Ameri-
can Potash remains very much the law. See 27 NLRB ANN. REP. 63 (1962). See
generally Weiner, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit, in N.Y.U. SIXTH ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE ON LABOR 515 (1953). See also Daykin, Determination of the Appropriate
Bargaining Unit by the NLRB: Principles, Rules, and Policies, 27 FORDHAM L. REV.
218 (1958); Krislov, Administrative Approaches to Craft Severance, 5 LAB. L.J. 231
(1954); Rathbun, The Taft-Hartley Act and Craft Unit Bargaining, 59 YALE L.J. 1023
(1950). The "historic" requirement was relaxed almost at once in Friden Calculating
[VOL. 18: 479
1967] APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT 529
The statute shows no such favor to departmental units. Nor do
the various semi-skilled and unskilled department store employees
possess, from one department to the next, the distinctive qualities
and diverse special interests which set craft employees apart from
other employees. In most stores the selling and non-selling em-
ployees have similar skills, are in constant contact with one another,
and experience considerable interchange. Often the wage scales are
identical. The possibility of dilution of earning power in a broader
unit does not exist. In short, the factors which justify separate craft
representation are largely absent from the department store context.
Moreover, the few situations in which the Board has tradition-
ally allowed separate departmental units reflect the vestiges of craft
unionism. In Overton Mkts.205 it was seen that meat department
employees were separately represented by the Amalgamated Meat-
cutters.2 °8 This is a carryover from the days when the butcher
workman was a skilled craftsman who, with his helpers, operated
his own shop. When department stores grew up, the butcher work-
man and his helpers came to be incorporated within the four walls,
yet located separately and performing skilled work. During the
1930's the Amalgamated M~atcutters, a craft union, not only orga-
nized the butcher workman and his helpers but, flexing its muscles,
organized nearby retail employees as well. After a generation of
fierce rivalry with the Retail Clerks, a jurisdictional agreement was
signed by the two unions in 1955, restricting the Meatcutters to meat
department employees and providing for final arbitration by AFL-
CIO President George Meany. The Overton Mkts. decision reflects
this historical development.
The fact that many non-craft employees are represented by a
craft union, however, suggests that today the cleavage between craft
and unskilled employees may not be as great as it once was. In-
deed, a number of craft employees are represented in plant-wide
units.207 Such unions as the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers and the International Association of Machinists represent
both unskilled workers and craftsmen."' The idea that a craft em-
ployee can be readily distinguished from a non-craft employee is
Mach. Co., 110 N.LR.B. 1618 (1954), where severance was allowed even though the
union was newly formed.
205142 N.LR.B. 615 (1963).
206 See text accompanying note 158 supra.
207 See note 65 supra.
208See S. D. Warren Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 204 (1963), discussed in note 58 supra.
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further cast in doubt by complaints of gerrymandering and lack of
predictability of the Board's craft determinations." 9
Yet if employees traditionally represented by craft unions are
becoming less distinguishable from ordinary unskilled employees,
then it would seem that the reason for the rule is disappearing and
therefore the rule of separate representation itself should fall. In-
deed, the most stunning blow to craft severance has come from the
AFL-CIO itself. By the terms of its Internal Disputes Plan adopted
as an amendment to the AFL-CIO Constitution in December, 1961,
a craft affiliate is prevented from seeking to sever a group of craft
employees from a broader production and maintenance unit already
represented by another AFL-CIO affiliate.21 Thus the gain which
the AFL made in section 9(b)(2) in 1947 has been voluntarily sur-
rendered by the merged organization. Some craft unions are al-
ready dissatisfied with this result, and perhaps at some future point
the Plan will be revised in the light of experience so as to except
craft severance from its broad no-raid terms. If not, the document
must be viewed as a clear preference on the part of organized labor
for broader, more stable units, with self-determination playing a
distinctly subordinate role.
Despite indications that craft severance may be on the wane, it
still seems desirable to permit separate representation of true craft
employees whose skills and earning power set them dearly apart
from the rest of the employees. This is justifiable not simply on the
crusty ground of tradition, but by modern notions of community of
interest as well. If this be so, then the very fact that organized
labor has made severance extremely difficult might suggest that the
Board need not add to the anti-craft movement by denying separate
representation in the first place.
Yet even though the validity of separate craft representation be
accepted, it remains true that the factors which justify separate craft
representation do not exist as between groups of department store
employees. Consequently the reliance on this analogy is largely
misplaced. 1' Whether one calls this a difference of kind or degree
is a question of semantics. To reject Allied Stores may be simply to
draw a line, or cut-off point, beyond which the risk of disruption
produced by separate intramural representation is no longer justi-
fied by the alleged distinct interests of particular employee groups.
209 See Krislov, supra note 204, at 238-40.
210 See note 75 supra.
211 The one significant contribution of this analogy to the analysis is the demon-
stration that the disruption caused by small intramural units need not be intolerable.
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Yet if the line is to be drawn in accordance with the Board's factors
as they have been evaluated here, this would seem to be the proper
place at which to draw it. This is particularly so in view of the
antagonism produced by separate unit treatment of proximately lo-
cated employees doing roughly similar work. If departmental units
are to be justified, they must be justified not by analogy but on the
very merits which produced craft severance in the first place. This
requires a far more distinct array of skills and bargaining objec-
tives than was found in Allied Stores.
IV. RECONCILIATION OF SELF-DETERMINATION
AND STABILITY
A. How the Board Does and Does Not Strike the Balance
It must by now be evident that to cite representation cases is
like citing the Bible: you can find some authority for just about any
proposition. Although no algebraic formula can reconcile all the
decisions, there are some dominant and common currents. The
Board tries to encourage bargaining along unit lines which will pro-
duce effective bargaining. Very small units are ineffectual and pro-
duce strife, whereas very large units may dilute small but distinguish-
able interests. Therefore, in most cases the Board seems to have
struck a flexible balance. The plant-wide manufacturing unit, the
regional or city-wide retail chain unit, and the single large depart-
ment store all reflect this policy. Moreover, the Board will allow
smaller units, as in Say-On Drugs, Inc. 1' and Quaker City Life Ins.
Co.,... where it is difficult for the union to organize along broader
lines and where the effect of requiring broader organization would
be to abridge section 7 organization rights.
In its most recent decisions, the Board seems to have become
overly preoccupied with the latter consideration. The survey of the
insurance cases shows little consistency in results. This together
with the fact that in forty-six out of forty-six cases the union .got
what it asked for does not make the decisions wrong, but it is some
indication that the Board is not taking the initiative in setting forth
standards for consistently appropriate units. This passive role was
blatantly apparent in the inadequate 1966 decision in Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. (Woonsocket) .24 Likewise, in such department store
212138 N..R.B. 1032 (1962).
213 134 N.L.R.B. 960 (1961), aff'd, 319 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1963), enforcing 138
N.L.R.B. 61 (1962).
214156 N.L.R.B. No. 113 (1966).
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decisions as Allied Stores, Inc.215 and S.A.G.E., Inc.,216 the opinions
are strained, as though the Board were uneasily aware of the frag-
mentation which it was producing. On the other hand, in the re-
tail chain store cases, although the decisions have not always been
consistent, there does not seem to have been great harm to the par-
ties caused by the results. The injury in the chain decisions is to
the administrative process. The Board's clumsy and inconsistent
use of precedent217 has confused and infuriated employers, unions,
and appellate courts, for whom "some" or "substantial" interchange
is not accurate enough, particularly when, upon close investigation
of the facts, "some" turns out to be more than "substantial."
B. What Should the Board Do?
(1) Adoption of Stability and Effectiveness of Labor Relations
as an Explicit Factor.-Stability seems to have been an implicit
factor in many of the Board's decisions. Notably in insurance and
public utilities, the Board has been willing to grant very large units
where the union can organize them. Stability would seem to be the
rationale for metropolitan or regional chain store units and is per-
haps the only factor by which the two Hot Shoppes decisions21 can
be reconciled. It is closely related to the functional integration fac-
tor, which itself may be regarded as an aspect of the stability factor,
as seen in Potter Aeronautical Corp.219 Stability would also seem to
be the driving force behind such decisions as S. D. Warren Co.,22 in
which several craft groups and some unskilled employees were
lumped together along loose divisional lines in a unit of four hun-
dred of the twenty-seven hundred employees in a plant. Finally,
both unions and employers would seem to be interested in stability,
as illustrated by the use of the accretion clause in the retail chain
industry,221 the AFL-CIO Internal Disputes Plan,222 and the consis-
tent objections by employers to fragmentation.223
By making this factor an explicit part of its analysis, the Board
215 150 N.L.R.B. 799 (1965).
216 146 N.L.R.B. 325 (1964).
217 See the excellent critique on this point in Note, The Board and Section 9(c)(5):
Multi-location and Single-location Bargaining Units in the Insurance and Retail Indus-
tries, 79 HARV. L. REV. 811, 832-33 (1966).
218 Hot Shoppes, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 138 (1961); Hot Shoppes, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B.
144 (1961). For a discussion of these cases, see text accompanying notes 142-45 supra.
219 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. (1966 CCH NLRB) 5 20037 (1965).
220 144 N.L.R1B. 204 (1963).
221 See text accompanying notes 183-91 supra.
222 See note 75 supra.
223 See text accompanying note 172 supra.
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would make its decisions more dear, consistent, and palatable to the
parties and reviewing courts. In applying the factor the Board
should consider the impact of its decision on employees both within
and without the unit, so that there is a "net" or "aggregate" benefit
to employee interests. Effective bargaining power and adminis-
trability by the union and the employer are also relevant aspects of
stability. This factor has the effect of emphasizing the continuing
bargaining relationship.
Having expressly recognized stability as a factor, the Board
should then endeavor to follow it more consistently.
(2) Limited Use of Self-Determination Elections To Prevent
"Sweep-ins."---In order to properly effectuate the section 9(b) man-
date, small units should be allowed in many cases where broader
organization is difficult. However, since there are often many levels
of "community of interest," a petition for a unit of any substantial
size may include a large number of component smaller appropriate
units, some of which might oppose the union while many of them
favor the union. As was seen in the insurance unit discussion, 24
the union may be in a position to "sweep-in" a number of unwilling
groups.
The problems of the "sweep-in" can be briefly illustrated by a
glance at the local government context. Where a city tries to an-
nex a piece of land with a distinguishable community of interest and
where the city's motives are primarily to increase its tax revenues,
courts have been quick to set aside the annexation.22 5  Likewise,
where a state constitution declares that a home-rule city is the ap-
propriate body to make certain kinds of decisions, a court will not
allow the legislature to set up a broader district to make such deci-
sions if the effect would be to allow the wishes of one home-rule
city to be overridden by the contrary wishes of another larger city.
226
On the other hand, when an outlying area dearly has a community
of interest with the city, as evidenced, for example, by use of the
city streets, shops, and public facilities, and protection by the city's
police and fire departments, the courts allow the annexation of the
suburban group even though that group may vote against annexa-
tion.12  Although in some respects the annexed group is distinct, if
224 See text accompanying note 126 supra.
22
r See Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 239 U.S. 478 (1916); Sugar Creek v.
Standard Oil Co., 163 F.2d 320 (8th Cit. 1947).
226Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 369 P.2d 68 (1962).
227 County of Norfolk v. City of Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 45 S.E.2d 136 (1947).
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its members participate in city activity they must abide by an over-
all metropolitan decision on the election of officials, taxation, and
other governmental policy.228
The dangers of the "sweep-in" might be avoided by separate elec-
tions in each component unit. This approach has particular merit
in that it places the right to abstain from unionization on an equal
footing with the right to join a union, as suggested by the language
of section 7. A proposal to this effect was recently advanced in a
student note in the Harvard Law Review"29 which focused largely
on maximizing the effect of employee free choice by "narrowing the
size of each unit to the greatest extent possible."23  It was also
urged that whenever a multilocation unit is requested, the union
should be certified only for those locations in which it wins a ma-
jority."' This proposal seems a bit abstract. First of all, the au-
thors suggest that the self-determination election be stopped at the
single location level.2"' Yet this seems arbitrary if their view of
maximum free choice is accepted. If, as the authors argue, a right
to abstain equals a right to join, then under Allied Stores, Inc. 3 or
S.A.G.E., Inc.,234 separate intramural self-determination elections
should be held. Indeed the single-location cut-off proposal over-
looks the fact that self-determination elections were born on the in-
tramural level in Globe Mach. & Stamping Co. 23
5
Were such a proposal adopted, the harm would lie not so much
in the administrative problem of numerous elections but rather in
resulting hopscotch, crazy-quilt organization that would bear no re-
lation to geographic contiguity. The proposal completely ignores
the desirability of stable and effective bargaining relations. The stu-
dent note's suggestion that small units should be encouraged as po-
tential building blocks to a broader bargaining base is particularly
ill-taken in the retail chain and department store industries, since
rival unions are likely to organize the other stores and introduce not
228 The analogy to the "free ride" is particularly apt, for suburban residents often
work in the city and enjoy its benefits while living in suburbia where the tax rates are
lower.
229 Note, The Board and Section 9(c)(5): Multi-locatian and Single-location Bar-
gaining Units in the Insurance and Retail Industries, 79 HARv. L. RgV. 811 (1966).
2301d. at 834.
231 Ibid.
232 1d. at 834 n.156.
23 150 N.L.R.B. 799 (1965).
234 146 N.L.R.B. 325 (1964).
233 3 N.L.RLB. 294 (1937).
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breadth and strength but factiousness and whipsawing. The au-
thors predicate their proposal on "the broad Taft-Hardey policy of
maximum freedom of choice." '36 This view of the Taft-Hartley
Act237 is hardly supported either by the language or by the legisla-
tive history. The authors neglected to point out, for instance, that
the proposal in section 9(f)(2) of the initial House version of the
bill2 8 requiring extensive self-determination elections was flatly re-
jected by Congress."'
Omitting the proposal to narrow the size of the units as much
as possible as well as the suggested single-location cutoff, there
does remain considerable merit in requiring the Board to conduct
self-determination elections in component units in any case in which
the Board would have granted a petition for one of the component
units alone. Indeed, this approach is irresistible if section 7240 really
means that, in drawing its unit lines, the Board should foster non-
unionism on equal terms with unionism. While the 1947 amend-
ment241 to this section expressing the right to abstain from organiza-
tional activity might be read as a directive to the Board to consider
the impact of its unit determination on those who wish to be out-
side the unit, an equally plausible reading would be that the sec-
tion demands respect for component groups within a large unit who
wish no union. Either interpretation may read more into the
amendment than was intended. The legislative history 42 makes it
dear that the 1947 amendment was added for the specific purpose
of preventing unions from coercing employees to join the union in
violation of section 8(b)(1),23 with no mention of representation
or bargaining unit cases. To be sure, sweeping an employee in
may be just as effective as coercing him to join. Nevertheless, sec-
tion 7 does not seem so forceful as to preclude looking elsewhere
in the statute for guidance.
Section 2 of the act, entitled "Findings and Policies," declares
236 Note, supra note 229, at 839.
23761 Star. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
2 8 -. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). For text of the bill, see 93 CONG. REC.
355 (1947).
23 9 H. CON. REP. No. 510 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). For a de-
scription of the congressional vote on the proposal, see 93 CONG. REC. 6392 (1947).
2 4 0 NLRA § 7, 49 Star. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
24161 Star. 140 (1947).
242 See H. CON. REP. No. 510 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1947).
See also 93 CoNG. Ec. 6372 (1947).
243 61 Stat. 141 (1947).
2 4 4 NLRA § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
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explicitly that it is the national policy to encourage collective bar-
gaining.245 A proposal to amend this declaration in 1947 was re-
jected by one of the most conservative Congresses in recent dec-
ades.24 While it is impossible to tell how far this policy should be
allowed to tip the scales in favor of encouraging unionization at
the risk of "sweep-ins," it is fair to say that it raises a serious question
as to the soundness or desirability of self-determination elections in
every component unit.
Reading sections 9,247 7, and 1 together, it might be reasonably
concluded that the unit determinations should effectuate not simply
a freedom of choice but a wider range of interests as well, notably
the interest in effective collective bargaining. Therefore, instead
of mandatory self-determination elections it would be more desir-
able to allow the appropriateness of the larger unit to guide the
Board's choice as to whether or not such separate elections should
be used. Where the union requests a broad unit and under the
established criteria the larger unit is more appropriate than separate
component units, the employees in the more appropriate unit should
abide by a majority choice.248 On the other hand, where the larger
unit is not more appropriate, e.g., where the requested unit is a
building-block combination, then self-determination elections within
the component parts should be held. Where the union requests
three out of eight stores in a city, the risk that at least one store is
being "swept-in" is great; the three-store grouping is clearly not
appropriate on its own merits (at least not more so than the single
store unit), and therefore it cannot justify the possibility of an acci-
dental "sweep-in." Such a risk might be justifiable, however, were
the union to request a city-wide unit of all eight stores - a pre-
sumably highly appropriate unit. In the three-store unit, self-deter-
245 It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to miti-
gate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encourag-
ing the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and desig-
nation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protec-
tion. Ibid.
246 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (original version).
247 NLRA § 9, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
248 It has already been observed that § 9(c) (5) should not prevent the Board from
choosing, even based on the union's petition, between two inherently appropriate units
of different scope. See text accompanying note 92 supra. The adoption of stable and
effective bargaining relations as an express factor should provide the Board with an in-
strument for making an intelligent choice between two such units, free from charges
of arbitrariness.
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mination elections should be held in each store (the units should
not be further fragmented, assuming a store-wide unit is found to
be more appropriate than departmental units). In the eight-store
unit, such separate elections would not be advisable.
This proposal does not rely solely on the section 1 policy decla-
ration for its validity. It is entirely consistent with the democratic
ideas of fairness reflected in the municipal annexation procedure.
It is not a significant departure from Board practice, but a shoring
up of it, with added safeguards.24 The necessity of subordinating
the wishes of a dissenting component unit to the interests of broader,
more effective collective bargaining has been recognized in a steady
line of decisions beginning with the Supreme Court's approval of
the Pittsburgh Plate Glass v. NLRB25 decision in 1941 denying
separate representation of one plant where a union was willing to
represent a unit of all six of an employer's plants. In Anheuser-
Busch, Inc.,251 the Board in 1953 rejected proposed small units in
favor of a broader overall unit, citing the "failure of bargaining on
the multi-unit basis to achieve stability in day-to-day relationships
between all parties affected."2 52 As recently as 1962, the Board in
Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp.253 declared that a vital aspect of its
function under 9(b) was to foster "efficient and stable collective
bargaining,"254 and that an erroneous determination "could only
create a state of chaos rather than foster stable collective bargaining,
and could hardly be said to 'assure to employees the fullest freedom
in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act' as contemplated by
Section 9 (b)."2"5
249 The Board often permits self-determination elections where one union requests
a large grouping and another union requests a smaller component unit. See, e.g., Mor-
gan Transfer & Storage Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1961) (allowing dock workers at a
new operation to choose between separate representation and inclusion in a broader
existing unit); Matheny Creek Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 515 (1949) (to determine whether
sawmill workers would be separately represented or included in a broad unit with log-
ging camp employees). However, the Board does not currently direct such elections
unless the smaller unit is requested by a union.
250313 U.S. 146 (1941), affirming 113 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1940), enforcing 15
N...1LB. 515 (1939). A similar position is taken by Freidin, Craft and Splinter Units,
in N.Y.U. 7TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 119 (1954). See also Note, N.L.R.B.
Rules for Determining the Appropriate Bargaining Unit in Craft and Departmental Sev-
erance Cases, 45 MiN. L. REV. 391, 409 (1961).
251102 N.L.R.B. 800 (1953).
252 Id. at 812. The idea here suggests the counter-vailing power argument to which
the Retail Clerks subscribe. A similar view is taken by Ackerman & Sullivan, Deter-
mination of the Appropriate Unit for Collective Bargaining, 54 W. VA. L REV. 17
(1951).2 5 3 136 N.L.R.B. 137 (1962).
2 4 Ibid.
255 Id. at 139-40.
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It may be said that these arguments simply cut against finding
a very small unit appropriate in the first place, but once a com-
ponent unit is found appropriate - that is, had the union requested
that unit alone, the Board would have found it appropriate - the
component should be allowed to dissent and reject the union. Yet
the reply to this must be that the overall purpose of the National
Labor Relations Act 56 is the promotion of industrial peace. This
objective is to be realized primarily not through the exercise of
individual free choice, but through the encouragement of collective
bargaining.257 Collective bargaining is to be fostered in appropri-
ate units, and the more appropriate the unit, the better. While a
less appropriate component unit must not be permitted to disrupt
the majority choice in an election held in the broader, more appro-
priate unit, it is still permissible to allow the smaller unit, even
though less appropriate, to organize by itself under the broad policy
in favor of collective bargaining. However, when both the units
in question are appropriate and there is a direct clash between the
policy in favor of collective bargaining and the policy in favor of
maximizing the effect of individual free choice, the latter must
yield to the former.
V. CONCLUSION
By way of recapitulation it can be said that the Board in each
unit determination is trying to draw the lines soas to include em-
ployees with common interests. This community is defined in
terms of similar or related skills and working conditions as well as
physical proximity and contiguity. Where two otherwise distinct
communities experience substantial interchange or functional inte-
gration which in turn produces interdependence, these two commu-
nities should generally be included in the same bargaining unit.
Once a bargaining relationship has a successful history, there is
justifiable reluctance to break it up at the whim of a dissenting
minority. In view of the political nature of the determination,
analogies from the context of state and local government may be
helpful in breaking a deadlock in the analysis.
Because the statute contemplates industrial stability and effec-
tive, harmonious bargaining relationships, and since the Board itself
has recognized this consideration in many of its decisions, it is pro-
25649 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1964).
257 For a similar view, see Cohen, Self-Determination Elections Among Previously
Unrepresented Employees in Fringe Groups: A Reexamination, 50 GEo. UJ. 187, 194-
95 (1961).
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posed that stability be acknowledged explicitly as a relevant factor
in all unit determinations. In order to minimize the possible injury
to employee democracy which may result from "sweep-ins," separate
self-determination elections should be held whenever a large unit
is not a more appropriate unit than one or more of its component
parts which, if alone requested, would be appropriate.
Finally, in response to the legitimate request for more dear and
consistent guidelines, it first must be observed that just as no two
improvement districts look exactly alike, there is bound to be vari-
ance from one unit to the next depending on the different fact situa-
tions. Indeed, there may be some fundamental differences from
one industry to the next. Retail chain and department store units,
where rival unionism is widespread, may justifiably differ in size
and diversity of content from units in the insurance industry, which
is dominated by a single union. Both are likely to differ from
manufacturing industries which may involve large numbers of un-
skilled workers and small groups of highly skilled craft employees.
These legitimate differences do not, however, absolve the Board
of its responsibility to hand down dearly written opinions in which
the established relevant factors are discussed and the Board's con-
clusions are supported by precise factual information. This does
not require longer opinions, nor should the opinions be entirely de-
voted to statistics. The parties are entitled to know what kind of
skills may be regarded as similar, what geographic considerations
are "cogent," how much is "substantial" interchange, in what re-
spects several functions are integrated, and the like. The need for
dear guidelines has become especially acute subsequent to the dele-
gation by the Board of the initial unit determination function to
the Regional Directors in 1961.258 For if the Board itself can be
ambiguous or inconsistent, how much more so will be those thirty-
one lesser administrative bodies, each trying to interpret and apply
the Board's past decisions. It is hoped that the analysis presented
herein may encourage a more effective application of the statute
and foster the kind of adjudication which will make the NLRB's
administrative process more satisfactory to the legitimate interests
of the parties involved.
258 This delegation, which took effect on May 16, 1961, was made pursuant to NLRA
3(b), as amended, 73 Star. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964). The relevant
regulations are found at 29 C.F.R. § 101.8 (1965). For a comment by a Regional
Director on the delegation, see McLeod, Bargaining Unit Problems: The Authority of
Regional Directors, N.Y.U. 15TH ANNUAL CONFmBRNCE ON LABOR 279 (1961).
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